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I. INTRODUCTION
Mention the term independent counsel to many lawyers and they think
immediately of the process whereby the Attorney General of the United
States requests the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate
and prosecute crimes potentially committed by government officials.
Business lawyers may think first of independent counsel in the context
of counsel for independent directors on a corporate board. For insurance
lawyers and most lawyers involved in tort litigation, however, the term
independent counsel has clear meaning: it describes a lawyer engaged to
defend an insured at a liability insurer’s expense in a case in which the
insurer has lost the right to control the insured’s defense because of an
irreconcilable conflict of interest. A conflict of interest does not erase a
liability insurer’s duty to defend its insured; the insurer must instead
cure the conflict to honor its duty.1 The insurer does this by ceding
control of the defense to independent counsel. The lawyer selected as
independent counsel makes all tactical decisions concerning the insured’s
defense, shares an attorney-client relationship solely with the insured,
and is loyal only to the insured, while the insurer pays the lawyer’s fees.
Independent counsel in insurance are sometimes described as “Cumis
counsel” in recognition of the seminal California case on the subject,
San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.2
In fact, the concept of independent counsel in insurance preceded Cumis
by a number of years.3
For an insured to be entitled to independent counsel, there must be a
conflict of interest that disqualifies a defense lawyer selected by the
insurer from representing the insured.4 Where there is no conflict of
interest, there is no right to independent counsel. Beyond the essential
requirement of a conflict, the circumstances implicating an insured’s
right to independent counsel vary between jurisdictions. Generally
speaking, the path to independent counsel in any case starts when an
insured requests that its liability insurer defend it in the suit and the
1. W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Herman, 405 F.2d 121, 124 (8th Cir. 1968); Roussos v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 655 A.2d 40, 43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
2. 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 506 (Ct. App. 1984), superseded by statute, Willie L.
Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch. 1498, 1987 Cal. Stat.
5779 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 1993)), as recognized in Dynamic
Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Ct. App. 1998).
3. See, e.g., Prashker v. U.S. Guar. Co., 136 N.E.2d 871, 876 (N.Y. 1956)
(offering independent counsel paid for by insurer as solution to expected conflicts of
interest); Emp’rs Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 403–04 (R.I. 1968) (discussing
two possible approaches to independent counsel), abrogated on other grounds by
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1995).
4. N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 124–25
(2d Cir. 2010) (discussing New York law).
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insurer agrees to do so under a reservation of rights.5 In theory, an
insurer’s defense under a reservation of rights poses a conflict of interest
because the insurer may be more concerned with developing facts that
will defeat coverage than with successfully defending the insured. As a
result, the alleged conflict is sometimes assumed to disqualify any lawyer
the insurer might hire to defend the insured. A minority of states
accordingly hold that an insurer’s defense under a reservation of rights
entitles the insured to independent counsel at the insurer’s expense.6
The majority and clearly better position, however, posits that not every
reservation of rights creates a conflict of interest entitling an insured to
independent counsel at the insurer’s expense.7 An insurer’s interest in
5. An insurance company informs an insured of its reservation of rights by
sending a reservation of rights letter. A reservation of rights letter is a unilateral notice
stating that the insurer reserves the right to contest coverage despite its initial decision to
undertake the insured’s defense. A reservation of rights letter puts the insured on notice
that there may be a conflict between its interests and those of the insurer, and that the
insured may potentially be exposed to personal liability not covered by insurance. A
letter from an insurer to an insured informing the insured that a verdict or judgment in
the case may exceed the liability limits of the insured’s policy, however, is not a
reservation of rights letter. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., 243 F.3d
1232, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001). Such a letter is properly termed an “excess letter.” In
states that hold that a reservation of rights creates a conflict of interest between the
insurer and the insured, an excess letter does not have the same effect. See id.
6. See, e.g., Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. A & M Assocs., Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 2d 84,
89–90 (D.R.I. 2002) (applying Massachusetts law); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Spangler, 881
F. Supp. 539, 544–45 (D. Wyo. 1995) (predicting Wyoming law); Great Divide Ins. Co.
v. Carpenter ex rel. Reed, 79 P.3d 599, 610–11 (Alaska 2003); Patrons Oxford Ins. Co.
v. Harris, 2006 ME 72, ¶¶ 11–23, 905 A.2d 819, 825–29; Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1069 (Miss. 1996); Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Twin City
Fire Ins. Co., 807 N.Y.S.2d 62, 66 n.1 (App. Div. 2006).
7. See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., Inc., 524
F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing Louisiana law); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ben
Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co. of S.C., 433 F.3d 365, 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing
South Carolina law and collecting cases); Rx.com Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 426
F. Supp. 2d 546, 559 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (applying Texas law); Armstrong Cleaners, Inc. v.
Erie Ins. Exch., 364 F. Supp. 2d 797, 807–08 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (applying Indiana law);
Tyson v. Equity Title & Escrow Co. of Memphis, 282 F. Supp. 2d 829, 831–32 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003); MetLife Capital Corp. v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 100 F. Supp. 2d 90,
94 (D.P.R. 2000); Long v. Century Indem. Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 490–91 (Ct. App.
2008); Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 975 P.2d 1159, 1174 (Haw. 1999); Mut.
Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Luetmer, 474 N.W.2d 365, 368–69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Twp. of
Readington v. Gen. Star Ins. Co., No. HNT-L-205-05, 2006 WL 551404, at *4 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 3, 2006); Red Head Brass, Inc. v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 735
N.E.2d 48, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Nisson v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 917 P.2d 488,
490 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Am. Home
Assurance Co., 261 S.W.3d 24, 40 (Tex. 2008); Johnson v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 788 P.2d
598, 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).

859

RICHMOND POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

9/23/2011 2:50 PM

negating coverage is not alone a conflict of interest.8 Rather, an insurance
company defending under a reservation of rights is obligated to
provide an insured with independent counsel only if the manner in which
the case is defended can affect coverage.9
Regardless of the exact circumstances, the requirement that an insured
be represented by independent counsel is significant because it reflects
the insurer’s loss of the very valuable right to control its insured’s defense.
Although an insurer may generally regain that right by agreeing to waive
any coverage defenses,10 that option is not always available or feasible.
Moreover, an insured’s entitlement to independent counsel raises a
number of critical questions. For example, what qualifies a lawyer or
law firm to serve as independent counsel? Who selects independent
counsel? How or on what basis should independent counsel be
compensated? Must independent counsel accept the same financial and
administrative constraints that insurers impose on their regular counsel?
What is the relationship between the insurer and independent counsel?
What duties do independent counsel owe and to whom do they owe
them? There is little authority to guide courts and lawyers analyzing
these issues, and only a few states regulate independent counsel in any
fashion. In the wake of Cumis, California enacted section 2860 of the
California Civil Code, which is a fairly comprehensive statute controlling
independent counsel relationships.11 Alaska has a similarly thorough
statute.12 Within its insurance claims administration statute, Florida
more modestly addresses compensation for independent counsel.13
This Article maps the critical contours of independent counsel in
insurance, beginning in Part II with the appropriate identification or
characterization of independent counsel, including their selection. Part
III examines independent counsel’s compensation. Finally, Part IV
discusses independent counsel’s relationship with the insurer in the case
being defended.

8. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Forge Indus. Staffing Inc., 567 F.3d 871, 874–75 (7th Cir. 2009).
9. Id. at 875 (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. W.H. McNaughton Builders,
Inc., 843 N.E.2d 492, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)).
10. See generally State ex rel. Rimco, Inc. v. Dowd, 858 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that an insurer “has the opportunity to control the litigation by
accepting the defense without reservation”).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 2009).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 21.96.100 (2008).
13. FLA. STAT. § 627.426(2)(b)(3) (West 2005).
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II. IDENTIFYING, CHARACTERIZING, AND SELECTING
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
At the outset, it is important to identify what it means to be
independent counsel, what qualifies lawyers or law firms to fill that role,
and how independent counsel may be selected. Turning back the clock,
there was a time when some courts championed an approach in which
independent counsel were perhaps better characterized as separate
counsel because they did not replace an insurer’s chosen defense counsel.
Instead, the insurer selected and paid for defense counsel for the insured
just as it regularly would and additionally paid for another lawyer who
was “pledged to promote and protect” the insured alone.14 The insured
was entitled to select the second lawyer, subject to the insurer’s
approval.15 Although the insurer was allowed to approve the insured’s
selection of a lawyer, such approval was not to be “unreasonably
withheld.”16
The weaknesses in this approach are obvious. First, engaging separate
counsel does not resolve the conflict of interest because the insurer
retains control of the defense.17 The insured receives independent advice
and gains oversight ability, but neither benefit is a fair substitute for
control of the defense. Second, injecting a second defense lawyer into a
case without vesting one of the lawyers with ultimate authority for
defense strategy and tactics is potentially awkward and inefficient.
Although the lawyers might work harmoniously in conducting the
defense, there may be times when agreement is unachievable. In the
event of an impasse, the lawyer hired by the insurer should not be
assigned ultimate authority given the conflict of interest requiring separate
counsel. Third, making the insurer pay for two lawyers increases
defense costs. If the insured will not allow the insurer to appoint sole
defense counsel, it is accordingly preferable for the insurer to insist that
the insured select independent counsel satisfactory to the insurer—as the
insurer is permitted to do under the separate counsel approach18—and
14. Emp’rs Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 404 (R.I. 1968), abrogated on
other grounds by Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1995).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW § 114, at 911 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that the “ultimate decision-making authority
cannot be divided between two parties”).
18. Id.
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entrust that lawyer with the defense. Allowing the insured to select
satisfactory independent counsel resolves the conflict of interest, preempts
inefficiencies in the defense, and cuts defense costs. It is therefore no
surprise that the modern rule favors independent counsel, not separate
counsel, for an insured.19
A. Identifying and Selecting Independent Counsel
The selection of lawyers as independent counsel is often a contentious
issue. The clear implication is that the insured must have the exclusive
right to select independent counsel because affording the insurance
company a role in the process will compromise the loyalty of any lawyer
selected.20 To be sure, when we speak of independent counsel in this
context, we mean counsel independent from an insurer. To serve as
independent counsel, a lawyer must be free of insurer control or
influence. A lawyer’s independence from an insurer, however, does not
necessarily require that the insurer be excluded from the selection process.
The concern that underpins independent counsel doctrine is that a
lawyer whom an insurer regularly engages to defend its insureds—socalled panel counsel—will either consciously or subconsciously favor
the insurer over the insured in any given matter, including one in which
coverage may be shaded in favor of the insurer.21 This incentive is
perceived to exist because the lawyer’s relationship with the insurer is
continual, supported by a strong financial interest in future assignments, and
sometimes characterized by genuine friendships between the lawyer and
members of the insurer’s claims or legal staff.22 Conversely, the lawyer’s
relationship with an insured “usually is transitory,” seldom extending
beyond a single case or claim.23 Few insureds are potential sources of
future engagements for a defense lawyer.
Yet, lawyers hired by insurers regularly defend insureds in cases in
which the insured’s and insurer’s interests are not perfectly aligned.24
The insurance defense bar has generally proven able to zealously defend

19. Id.
20. See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 30:3,
at 149–50 (2010 ed.).
21. Lawyers who regularly defend insureds for insurers are known as panel
counsel because they are selected from panels of law firms with which carriers have
continuing relationships. Panel firms agree to abide by an insurer’s billing and litigation
management requirements. They typically negotiate special compensation arrangements
with insurers. Insurers often have different panels of firms for different types of
coverage or lines of business.
22. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 20, § 30:3, at 149–50.
23. Id. at 150.
24. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 17, § 114, at 919.
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insureds in such circumstances, and it is crystal clear that the overwhelming
majority of insurance defense attorneys vigorously defend the insureds
they are hired to represent regardless of insurers’ coverage positions.25
There is no persuasive reason to believe that they would do otherwise.
Defense lawyers who subvert insureds’ interests to insurers’ interests
risk professional discipline and malpractice liability.26 Insurers that
condone or encourage such conduct risk bad faith liability. A reservation of
rights does not alter an insurer’s contractual duty to defend its insured.27
Upon weighing these factors, it is reasonable to conclude that insurers
should be permitted to select independent counsel for insureds as long as
the appointed defense lawyers understand that the insured is their sole
client and the insurer acts honestly and responsibly in the process.
Several courts have endorsed this approach.28
Federal Insurance Co. v. X-Rite, Inc.29 leads this line of authority. XRite and its CEO, Darrell Thompson, were sued on several theories in a
case referred to as the “O’Connor litigation.”30 X-Rite engaged Varnum,
Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett (Varnum), to defend the O’Connor
litigation and, two months later, notified its insurer, Federal Insurance
Co. (Federal), of the suit and retention of Varnum.31 Federal responded
by way of a letter acknowledging its duty to defend the O’Connor

25. Id.
26. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 20, § 30:3, at 154 (“[E]mployment by an
insurer does not diminish the ethical obligations and standard of care for insurance
defense counsel.”).
27. See Willis Coroon Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2000)
(applying Illinois law); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 839
So. 2d 614, 616 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d
1133, 1137 (Wash. 1986)); 1 ALAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 4:20,
at 4-172 (5th ed. 2007).
28. See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co. of S.C.,
433 F.3d 365, 371–74 (4th Cir. 2005) (interpreting South Carolina law); H.K. Sys., Inc.
v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 03C0795, 2005 WL 1563340, at *16 (E.D. Wis. June 27, 2005)
(predicting Wisconsin law); Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. Royal Oak Enters., Inc., 344
F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1374–76 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (predicting Florida law); United States v.
Daniels, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1290 (D. Kan. 2001) (interpreting Kansas law); Cent.
Mich. Bd. of Trs. v. Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 627, 633–37 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (interpreting Michigan law); Cardin v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp.
330, 335–38 (D. Md. 1990) (discussing Maryland law); Fed. Ins. Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748
F. Supp. 1223, 1228–30 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145,
1154 (Haw. 1998).
29. 748 F. Supp. 1223.
30. Id. at 1224–25.
31. Id. at 1225.
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litigation, declining to allow Varnum to continue as defense counsel,
proposing to substitute the firm of Vandeveer, Garzia, Tonkin, Kerr &
Heaphy (Vandeveer) for Varnum, and reserving its rights to deny
coverage with respect to three of the causes of action.32 Neither X-Rite
nor Thompson responded to Federal, and the O’Connor litigation went
on with Varnum holding the defense helm.33 Months later, when Federal
insisted that Vandeveer be substituted as defense counsel for Varnum,
X-Rite revealed for the first time that it had received a $125,000 settlement
offer through mediation that would soon expire.34 The next communication
of any significance came months later, when Varnum informed Federal
that the O’Connor litigation had settled for $125,000, requested that
Federal indemnify X-Rite for the settlement, and sought reimbursement
of roughly $71,000 in attorney’s fees.35 Federal responded by filing a
declaratory judgment action in a Michigan federal court.36
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the declaratory
judgment action.37 One of the issues was whether X-Rite was entitled to
insist on counsel of its choice at Federal’s expense.38 After surveying
the law from various jurisdictions, the court concluded that it was not.39
In a footnote, the court explained the meaning of independent counsel:
“Independent counsel” is a term which has not been defined in the case law.
The representation of Vandeveer . . . was tendered to X-Rite with a clear
explanation of the firm’s role, designed to assure X-Rite of its independence.
Specifically, Federal assured X-Rite that Vandeveer . . . would handle the defense
of all claims asserted against X-Rite; that it would represent X-Rite only, not
Federal, and would direct its efforts only to the best interests of X-Rite; and that
it would not be involved directly or indirectly in coverage issues. These assurances
are reasonable and, absent any contrary showing, effective to establish
[Vandeveer’s] independence.40

The X-Rite court also detailed the pertinent facts:
When Federal received notice of the action against X-Rite, it proceeded in
accordance with black letter Michigan law by undertaking the defense with a
reservation of rights. Further, Federal tendered the representation of “independent
counsel,” the Vandeveer . . . firm. X-Rite objected not because it believed
Vandeveer . . . was not “independent,” but because it questioned the qualifications
of . . . Vandeveer . . . to competently defend [two of the] claims [asserted
against it], and because it believed the conflict created by Federal’s reservation

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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of rights gave it the absolute right to retain counsel of its choice at Federal’s
expense.41

Furthermore, X-Rite’s conduct evidenced “a cavalier disregard” for
the language in the Federal policy granting Federal the right to defend its
insureds and thus protect its own interests in any litigation implicating
its duty to defend.42 Unless Federal’s contractual right to defend was “to
be deemed mere surplusage,” it had to be viewed as granting the insurance
company “some prerogative with respect to the [O’Connor litigation]
beyond simply paying defense costs.”43 The fact that Federal was not
entitled to absolute control over the defense of the O’Connor litigation
by virtue of its conflict of interest did not compel the conclusion that it
lost its right to defend entirely. Absent some public policy to the contrary,
Federal’s contractual right to defend X-Rite and Thompson could hardly
“contemplate anything less than its participation in the selection of
[defense] counsel.”44 As for public policy, the court observed: “Public
policy requires the insurer to act with utmost good faith. As long as this
standard is observed, the Court may not interfere with the terms of the
parties’ agreement.”45
The X-Rite court was unwilling to conclude that an insurer defending
under a reservation of rights automatically breaches its duty of good
faith and fair dealing by selecting defense counsel. To do so would be to
presume that defense counsel are unable to represent their client, “the
insured, without consciously or unconsciously compromising the insured’s
interests.”46 The court reasoned that the defense bar deserved greater
confidence and respect than that presumption would accommodate.47
In summary, the court determined that the conflict of interest
attributable to “Federal’s reservation of rights did not automatically
entitle X-Rite to counsel of its choice at Federal’s expense.”48 There
being no evidence that Vandeveer was not independent or that by
insisting on Vandeveer’s representation Federal acted in bad faith,
created an actual conflict of interest, or otherwise prejudiced X-Rite’s
41. Id. at 1228 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 1229.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
47. Id. (“The Court is unable to conclude that Michigan law professes so little
confidence in the integrity of the bar of this state.”).
48. Id. at 1230.
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interests, the court concluded that X-Rite acted unreasonably in refusing
a defense by Vandeveer in the O’Connor litigation.49
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Royal Oak Enterprises, Inc.50 is a more
recent case on point. This case arose out of the death of Royal Oak
employee John Tilton, who was killed on the job in Royal Oak’s Ocala,
Florida facility.51 Royal Oak was insured under a workers’ compensation
and employers’ liability insurance policy issued by Travelers.52 Tilton’s
estate sued Royal Oak in a local state court for alleged negligence in
causing Tilton’s death.53 Travelers hired Wayne Argo, of the two-lawyer
firm Weiner & Argo, to defend the suit.54 Royal Oak thought Weiner &
Argo was too small to handle the case but nonetheless acquiesced in the
firm’s engagement.55
Some three months into the litigation, Tilton’s estate offered to settle
for $750,000, which was within the Travelers policy’s liability limits.56
Argo informed Travelers and the vice president of the Royal Oak’s
Ocala facility of the offer.57 Only days before the settlement offer was
due to expire, the estate’s lawyers told Argo of their intent to amend
their complaint to allege punitive damages.58 Argo informed Travelers
of this development and opined that the court would likely grant the
amendment if requested but did not share the information with Royal
Oak.59 Travelers permitted the estate’s settlement offer to expire.60
The estate eventually filed its motion to amend, and the proposed
amended complaint not only sought punitive damages but for the first
time included an intentional tort claim. 61 The intentional tort claim
would abrogate Royal Oak’s workers’ compensation immunity and
would further fall outside the coverage afforded by the Travelers policy.62
After studying the proposed amended complaint, Travelers sent Royal
Oak a reservation of rights letter with respect to both the punitive
damage and intentional tort claims.63 Travelers also wrote that Weiner
& Argo would continue to represent Royal Oak but added: “We elicit
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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your participation in the selection of counsel, and will assume that
[Weiner & Argo] is mutually agreeable to you if you do not notify us to
the contrary in writing within ten (10) days.”64 Finally, Travelers
informed Royal Oak of its right to engage personal counsel at its own
expense to advise and represent it in connection with the allegations that
Travelers believed were not covered under its policy.65
Royal Oak promptly responded with a letter of its own, questioning
Weiner & Argo’s ability to effectively represent it given the firm’s size,
asserting that Travelers had not allowed it to have meaningful input into
the selection of defense counsel, faulting Travelers for allowing the
$750,000 settlement offer to lapse, and criticizing Travelers for permitting
the settlement offer to expire without consultation.66 These and other
examples, Royal Oak complained, indicated that Weiner & Argo might
not be sufficiently independent to guard its interests and prevented it
from agreeing to the firm’s continued defense of the Tilton case.67 Thus,
Royal Oak continued, it was engaging the Atlanta firm of King &
Spalding to defend it in the Tilton matter, and it reserved its own rights
to recoup King & Spalding’s fees from Travelers.68
Countering, Travelers suggested several other firms in the Ocala area
to replace Weiner & Argo.69 Royal Oak rejected the alternative firms,
and ultimately, Travelers agreed to pay 75% of the fees and expenses to
have a King & Spalding lawyer join Argo as co-counsel.70
The trial court granted the estate’s motion to amend its complaint, and
after the estate filed the amended complaint, Travelers filed a declaratory
judgment action in a Florida federal court.71 Travelers then settled the
Tilton case for $750,000.72 Travelers sought to recover that sum from
Royal Oak in the declaratory judgment action, and Royal Oak
counterclaimed to recover the fees it paid to King & Spalding.73 Both
sides moved for summary judgment.74
64.
omitted).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. (quoting Travelers’ reservation of rights letter) (internal quotation marks
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1363–64.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Royal Oak asserted three bases for requiring Travelers to pay for its
independent counsel: (1) Argo’s defense was so inadequate that Royal
Oak was forced to hire independent counsel, (2) Travelers defended
under a reservation of rights, and (3) there was a conflict of interest
between Travelers and Royal Oak obligating Travelers “to pay for
[independent counsel] of Royal Oak’s choosing.”75 The court rejected
all three arguments, with the first two falling quickly. As for the first,
any alleged errors by Argo were immaterial and did not prejudice Royal
Oak.76 As a result, Royal Oak was not “forced” to retain independent
counsel.77 Regarding the second, there was simply no support for it
under Florida law.78 That left Royal Oak’s conflict of interest argument.
Royal Oak argued that a conflict arose when the Tilton estate amended
its complaint to add the punitive damage and intentional tort claims,
thereby “prompt[ing] Travelers to reserve its rights to deny coverage.”79
After discussing the competing positions on conflicts of interest in
insurance defense, the court predicted that the Florida Supreme Court
would hold that on these facts Travelers was not obligated to pay for
Royal Oak’s independent counsel.80 In so deciding, the court focused on
Travelers’ right to defend Royal Oak:
This meaningful contract right should not be penalized merely because there
exists the potential for insurer-selected counsel to become impermissibly
conflicted in its representation. To so hold would require this Court to
recognize a conclusive presumption, based on nothing more than the existence
of a potential conflict between the insured and the insurer, that counsel is unable
to provide independent representation. The Court is not willing to graft such an
unwarranted presumption into the law. Instead, there must be some evidence to
suggest that the conflict between the insurer and the insured actually affected
counsel’s representation so that it may be said that counsel’s actions elevated
the interests of the insurer over those of his client, the insured.81

Royal Oak contended that Argo prioritized Travelers’ interests when
he informed it of the Tilton estate’s plan to amend its complaint but did
not similarly inform Royal Oak.82 Had it known of the prospective
amendments, Royal Oak contended, it would have urged Travelers to
settle the case while there was only the covered negligence count to
consider.83 The court was not persuaded. When the settlement offer was
made, the estate had not yet moved to amend its complaint, and
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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Travelers had yet to reserve its rights.84 As a result, the conflict on
which Royal Oak’s argument rested was merely potential, not actual.85
Argo had informed Royal Oak when the estate actually moved to amend
its complaint, but the company did not then urge settlement before the
motion was granted.86 Finally, the court had previously determined that
Travelers did not act in bad faith in declining the estate’s initial
settlement offer.87
There was no evidence that the conflict between Travelers and Royal
Oak in any way affected Argo’s defense of Royal Oak—Argo recognized
that he owed Royal Oak a duty of loyalty and acted accordingly.88
Royal Oak never complained of Argo’s disloyalty, and there was no
evidence that Travelers attempted to compromise Argo’s professional
judgment.89 Although Royal Oak was within its right to engage King &
Spalding to supplement Argo’s defense, it did not follow that Travelers
was obligated to finance that exercise.90
Finally, the court was convinced that rules of professional conduct and
the threat of legal malpractice liability sufficiently protected insureds
from misconduct by allegedly conflicted defense counsel.91 Royal Oak’s
counterclaim for reasonable attorney’s fees therefore failed.
The X-Rite and Royal Oak courts make good points about the
trustworthiness of insurer-hired defense lawyers and the lack of
justification for presuming that they will either consciously or
subconsciously compromise the interests of insureds they are engaged to
defend. The Royal Oak court’s view that state ethics rules and the threat
of malpractice liability safeguard insureds’ interests is understandable.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that an insurer’s selection of
defense counsel for an insured does not alone establish that lawyer’s
lack of independence.92 Nonetheless, neither the X-Rite nor Royal Oak
decisions nor those of like-minded courts grant insurers an unfettered
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1374–75.
89. Id. at 1375.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Cent. Mich. Bd. of Trs. v. Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp., 117 F. Supp.
2d 627, 636 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (discussing the sanctity of fiduciary relationships and the
nature of the tripartite relationship between insurers, insureds, and insurance defense
counsel).
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right to select independent counsel for insureds. Insurers must exercise
good faith when selecting defense counsel, and any lawyer hired to
defend an insured in a case involving a conflict of interest must be “truly
independent.”93 An insurer may initially establish the independence of
lawyers it selects by clearly instructing the lawyers at the outset of the
case that (1) the insured is their sole client, (2) they are to direct all their
efforts to benefit the insured alone, and (3) they are to have no role
whatsoever in coverage matters.94 An insured may reject independent
counsel selected by an insurer if the insured can demonstrate that such
instructions were not given, were somehow ineffective, or were disregarded
by the lawyer. This showing requires more than mere conjecture or
speculation on the insured’s part. Once a representation is underway, an
insured may reject independent counsel appointed by an insurer if the
lawyer’s representation is “objectively inadequate,” meaning that the
lawyer “fails to ‘vigorously and adequately’ defend the insured.”95 That
determination will naturally pivot on the facts of the particular case.
At the other end of the spectrum, a number of courts hold that the
insured is entitled to select independent counsel.96 Indeed, this approach
has been described as the majority rule.97 Courts adhering to this rule
assume that an insurer’s instructions to a defense lawyer functioning as
independent counsel to represent the insured alone and to act exclusively
for the insured’s benefit cannot overcome the lawyer’s “human nature”
to treat the insurance company as a client.98 These courts further reason
that it is not satisfactory to burden the insured with suing the defense
lawyer for malpractice somewhere down the road should the lawyer

93. Id. at 635.
94. Fed. Ins. Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1990);
see also Cardin v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp. 330, 335–37 (D. Md. 1990)
(suggesting that satisfaction of the first two factors is sufficient to confer “independent
counsel” status).
95. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Stevens Forestry Serv., Inc., 335 F.3d 353, 356
(5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Circle, Inc., 915 F.2d 986, 991 (5th
Cir. 1990)).
96. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tedford, 658 F. Supp. 2d 786, 794 (N.D.
Miss. 2009) (interpreting Mississippi law); Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., 902 F. Supp.
877, 880–82 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (predicting Arkansas law); Cunniff v. Westfield, Inc.,
829 F. Supp. 55, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying New York law); Great Divide Ins. Co. v.
Carpenter ex rel. Reed, 79 P.3d 599, 610 (Alaska 2003); Joseph v. Markovitz, 551 P.2d
571, 576–77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Compulink Mgmt. Ctr., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 75 (Ct. App. 2008); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
W.H. McNaughton Builders, Inc., 843 N.E.2d 492, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Smith v.
Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 01-888, p. 12 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/15/02); 807 So. 2d 1010, 1022;
Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1070–71 (Miss. 1996).
97. See Knife Co., 902 F. Supp. at 880–81.
98. Id. at 881.
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succumb to inevitable pressures and subordinate the insured’s interests
to the insurer’s.99
CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.100 is a leading
case recognizing insureds’ right to select independent counsel. Employers
Reinsurance Corp. (ERC) offered to defend CHI in a serious personal
injury action under a reservation of rights.101 CHI protested that the
reservation of rights created a conflict of interest entitling it to independent
counsel under Alaska law and insisted that its personal attorney, Brett
von Gemmingen, defend it.102 ERC expressed concern about von
Gemmingen’s experience in handling cases of this nature and suggested
that CHI provide it with the names of more experienced lawyers that
ERC might engage as independent counsel.103 CHI refused the request,
and in response, ERC offered to allow von Gemmingen to represent CHI
on the uncovered claim triggering the reservation, while ERC retained a
firm of its choosing to act as co-counsel and to assume responsibility for
the overall defense of the suit.104 CHI declined that offer as well and
then filed a declaratory judgment action to vindicate its position on
retaining independent counsel of its choice.105
ERC and CHI both moved for summary judgment. CHI argued that
ERC should have no role in selecting defense counsel because “any
attorney selected by an insurance company ‘[would] attempt to help his
real client, the insurance company, at the expense of the insured.’”106
Retaining von Gemmingen to defend claims outside of coverage would
not resolve the conflict, CHI reasoned, because the dual representation
that ERC proposed would permit the law firm hired by ERC “to work
against the interests of the insured and in addition would cause confusion
concerning who [was] to control various litigation decisions.”107 ERC
argued that it had eliminated any potential conflicts of interest by
allowing von Gemmingen to defend the uncovered claim at its expense.108
The trial court found for ERC, and CHI appealed to the Alaska Supreme

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id.
844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993).
Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting CHI’s court papers).
Id. at 1114–15.
Id. at 1115.
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Court.109 The supreme court was asked to answer two key questions.
First, did the co-counsel scheme ERC proposed satisfy CHI’s right to
independent counsel? Second, did CHI have the unilateral right to select
independent counsel?
The court concluded that ERC’s proposed co-counsel arrangement did
not satisfy its duty to provide independent counsel for CHI because it did
not cure the conflict of interest.110 There were two reasons for this.
First, the law firm selected by ERC would have access to information
known to or held by CHI that could be used against CHI in subsequent
coverage litigation.111 Second, the law firm selected by ERC would be
able to direct the defense and, in doing so, might be able to influence the
ultimate coverage determination.112
With respect to CHI’s right to select independent counsel, the court
began its analysis by noting that “most cases” on the subject “express the
view that the insured has the right to select independent counsel of its
choice.”113 The court agreed that an insured has the unilateral right to
select independent counsel of its choice but tempered by its implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing.114 In this context, the insured’s duty of
good faith and fair dealing requires it to select as independent counsel a
lawyer “who is, by experience and training, reasonably thought to be
competent to conduct the defense.”115 As the court explained its reasoning:
Such a result . . . fairly balances the interest of the insured—being defended by
competent counsel of undivided loyalty—with the interests of the insurer—
having the defense of the insured conducted by competent counsel. The insurer
is only required to pay the reasonable cost of the defense. . . . This provides a
measure of protection for insurers against overbilling—and overlitigating—by
independent counsel.116

It was unclear whether von Gemmingen was qualified to defend CHI
in the underlying case. There was at least some evidence that he might
not be because it was a serious case and he had been out of law school
for only four years at the time the controversy arose.117 On remand, it
would be necessary for the trial court to determine his qualifications.118

109. Id.
110. Id. at 1119.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1119–20 (quoting Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, Will the
Real Counsel for the Insured Please Rise?, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 27, 37–38 (1987)).
113. Id. at 1120 (citing Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. U.S. Fire Co., 885 F.2d
826, 831 (11th Cir. 1989)).
114. Id. at 1121.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 1126 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 1121 (majority opinion).
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If von Gemmingen was qualified to handle the case, then the defense
could go forward with him in charge.119 If he was not qualified, however,
CHI would be required to select different independent counsel.120
The CHI of Alaska decision was not unanimous. There was a reasoned
dissent by Justice Daniel A. Moore Jr., who, despite agreeing that the
insured should be entitled to select independent counsel, expressed
concern that allowing the insured to do so unilaterally did not adequately
respect the insurer’s contractual right to defend the insured.121 He would
have thus qualified an insured’s right to select independent counsel by
allowing an insurer a “right of reasonable approval” over the insured’s
choice.122 Under his proposed regime, an insurer would not be able to
“unreasonably withhold” approval of an insured’s proposed independent
counsel.123
Justice Moore was also bothered by the majority’s requirement that an
insured employ as independent counsel a lawyer “reasonably thought to
be competent to conduct the defense” of the underlying litigation
because the majority failed to specify by whose standards competency
should be measured.124 Absent any objective criteria for determining
independent counsel’s competency, the measure of protection the
majority thought it was affording to insurers was “both inadequate and
unworkable.”125 In light of von Gemmingen’s relative inexperience,
ERC’s reluctance to accept him as defense counsel was understandable.126
Finally, Justice Moore reasoned that the majority’s concern that
allowing insurers a voice in the selection of independent counsel would
somehow taint the defense was either speculative or exaggerated.127 If
insurer-selected defense lawyers were to breach their duties to the
insured as part of a scheme to further the insurer’s interests, the lawyers
would potentially expose themselves to professional discipline and
malpractice liability, and the insurer would face liability for bad faith.128
Those remedies adequately protect insureds and serve “as a strong

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1121–22 (Moore, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1122.
Id.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id. at 1127–28.
Id. at 1128.

873

RICHMOND POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

9/23/2011 2:50 PM

disincentive to both insurers and defense counsel to compromise the
insured’s interest.”129
Justice Allen Compton also dissented. He observed that a lawyer
hired by an insured was just as subject to ethical pressures as was a
lawyer hired by an insurer, and that a lawyer selected by an insured might
still be tempted to favor the insurer’s interests if the lawyer thought that
the insurer might ultimately offer a more rewarding financial relationship
than that provided by the insured.130 Justice Compton recognized that
the insured should be allowed to select independent counsel, but he
proposed that an insured’s right to appoint independent counsel should
be subject to the insured’s contractual duty to cooperate.131
B. Two Independent Counsel Are a Crowd
In states that permit insureds to select independent counsel as a means
of remedying an alleged conflict of interest, an insured generally must
reject defense counsel offered by the insurer before it may employ its
desired defense counsel at the insurer’s expense.132 If the insured does
not do so, it must pay for any personal counsel whom it engages.133 An
insurer that has satisfied its duty to furnish independent counsel for an
insured has no obligation to additionally pay for an insured’s personal
counsel.134 This is true regardless of whether the insured’s personal
counsel is actively involved in the defense or simply supervises or
monitors defense counsel engaged by the insurer. It also holds true
where, for example, an insured has regular corporate counsel and wants
its insurer to compensate those lawyers for time spent supervising or
coordinating the activities of the defense lawyers that the insured selects
as independent counsel.
This rule is sensible. An insurer has no duty to provide an insured
with duplicative representation in a case in which the insurer controls the
defense, and there is no reason that transfer of defense control to the
insured should change matters. Any protection from insurer influence
129. Id. at 1128–29.
130. Id. at 1130 (Compton, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1130–31.
132. See, e.g., Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Stevens Forestry Serv., Inc., 335 F.3d
353, 356 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Louisiana law); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v.
Frankel Enters., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1311–12 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (discussing
Florida law); Aguero v. First Am. Ins. Co., 927 So. 2d 894, 897–98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
133. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 335 F.3d at 356.
134. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Zadeck Energy Grp., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 654, 661
(W.D. Ark. 2005) (deciding case under Arkansas law); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. A & M
Assocs., Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 2d 84, 93–94 (D.R.I. 2002) (applying Massachusetts law);
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 563 F. Supp. 187, 190–91 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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that the insured arguably requires is accomplished by the appointment of
a single law firm or lawyer as independent counsel. Moreover, an
insurer that is required to provide an insured with independent
counsel is still bound only to pay reasonable attorney’s fees.135 To
require an insurer to pay two lawyers to do the job of one is “patently
unreasonable.”136
C. Summary and Synthesis
It is generally reasonable to allow an insurance company to appoint
independent counsel for an insured. The insurer must act honestly and
objectively in doing so, of course, and must exercise good faith at all
times. There are three ways that an insurer may control the selection of
independent counsel for an insured. First, the insurer may appoint
defense lawyers from among the law firms with which it regularly deals
and instruct the lawyers that they are to (1) represent the insured alone,
(2) consider the insured their sole client, (3) act exclusively in the
insured’s best interests at all times and be guided by the insured’s best
interests when making all strategic or tactical decisions, and (4) have
absolutely no role in coverage issues insofar as the insurer is
concerned.137 Second, an insurer might appoint a lawyer from a firm
that, although not a member of the insurer’s regular defense panel, is on
a list of law firms that the insurer has preselected for independent
counsel assignments based on their capabilities and, presumably, the
reasonableness of their proposed fees. Third, the insurer might select a
lawyer from a firm with which it has no prior relationship but whom the
insurer reasonably believes is qualified to represent the insured. Any
lawyers appointed under the second or third options must receive the

135. Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 172 F.3d 601, 604–06 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying
Minnesota law); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (citing Magoun v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 195 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Mass. 1964)); MetLife Capital Corp. v. Water
Quality Ins. Syndicate, 100 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.P.R. 2000); CHI of Alaska, Inc., 844
P.2d at 1121 (majority opinion); IMC Global v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 883 N.E.2d 68, 80 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007); Nisson v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 917 P.2d 488, 490–91 (Okla. Civ.
App. 1996).
136. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
137. Fed. Ins. Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1990);
see also Cardin v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp. 330, 335–37 (D. Md. 1990)
(suggesting that satisfaction of the first three factors listed here is sufficient to
characterize a defense lawyer selected by an insurer as independent counsel).
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same instructions with respect to their expected independence as the
lawyers chosen under the first approach.
As for why it is reasonable to allow an insurer to select independent
counsel subject to the conditions outlined above, that is simple: it is
unreasonable to assume that a defense lawyer selected by an insurer will
either consciously or subconsciously favor the insurer over the insured
and somehow prejudice the insured in the process.138 An attorney
employed by an insurer to defend an insured “is bound by the same high
standards which govern all attorneys, and owes the insured the same
duty as if he were privately retained by the insured.”139 State ethics rules
prohibiting conflicts of interest and mandating confidentiality and
independence of professional judgment, and potential liability for breach
of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice, are powerful incentives for
insurer-selected independent counsel to faithfully serve the insureds they
are hired to represent.140 There is no empirical evidence to support the
seeming presumption that defense lawyers picked by insurers will
naturally succumb to business influences and subvert insureds’ interests
as a result, and anecdotal reports of such alleged disloyalty are scarce at
best.141 Indeed, given the vast number of cases in which insurance
defense counsel participate, and the exceedingly few cases in which their
conduct is challenged, it is far more logical to presume that defense
lawyers engaged by insurers will put aside their business considerations
and provide insureds the competent, diligent, and faithful representation
they deserve.
In addition, the supposedly symbiotic relationship between insurance
companies and their panel counsel whom courts fear will jeopardize
insureds’ representations when coverage is at issue is arguably a relic.
Insurers’ relentless efforts at cost control and litigation management
have alienated or disillusioned many defense lawyers. The last two
decades have borne witness to “[t]he dramatic deterioration of the
relationship between many insurance defense firms and the insurers that
engage their services.”142 From an overall perspective, defense lawyers’
loyalty to their insurance company clients has also been strained by
insurers’ increasing willingness to move business for economic or
138. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co. of S.C., 433
F.3d 365, 373 (4th Cir. 2005); X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. at 1229; Finley v. Home Ins.
Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 1151–54 (Haw. 1998).
139. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mabry, 497 S.E.2d 844, 847 (Va. 1998) (quoting
Norman v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 239 S.E.2d 902, 907 (Va. 1978)).
140. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 433 F.3d at 373.
141. See Michael M. Marick & Karen M. Dixon, The Insurer’s Contract “Right”
To Defend—The “Tripartite” Relationship Reconsidered, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC.
L.J. 1119, 1127–28 (2004).
142. Id. at 1227.
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performance-related reasons. Long story short, courts’ presumption of a
close and harmonious relationship between insurers and their regular
defense counsel is seriously suspect, and it therefore provides an
unreliable basis for guiding independent counsel decisions.143
To the extent that courts distrust lawyers’ motives, there is no
assurance that independent counsel selected by an insured will be
devoted to the insured. A lawyer selected as independent counsel by an
insured may nonetheless favor the insurer’s interests out of the belief or
hope that, over the long term, the insurance company will be a more
fertile source of legal business than the insured. Depending on the
insured, this may well be true even where independent counsel is the
insured’s regular lawyer.
Furthermore, an insurer has no incentive to influence independent
counsel’s defense of the insured in a fashion detrimental or prejudicial to
the insured, or to prod independent counsel to manipulate coverage. An
insurer that did so would surely be estopped from asserting any coverage
defenses it otherwise might have enjoyed,144 and it would face bad faith
liability.145 Because bad faith liability carries with it the potential for
damages well beyond an insurer’s policy limits, as well as the threat of
punitive damages, it effectively brakes insurers’ potential inclination to
compromise independent counsel relationships.
Even if an insurer required to provide an insured with independent
counsel is deemed to have lost its right to defend the subject case such
that the insurer’s right to defend cannot be a basis for allowing the
insurer to select independent counsel, good practical reasons remain
for allowing insurers to select independent counsel. Liability insurers
are professional litigants. Insurers typically select their regular defense
counsel based on the lawyers’ experience and skill in the substantive
areas of risk being underwritten. To do otherwise would be foolhardy

143. See id. at 1128 & n.30 (noting that “strong and valuable working relationships”
do exist between many defense firms and insurers without necessarily creating an
attorney-client relationship, and urging courts to examine the facts of the particular case
rather than relying on assumptions that may not be accurate).
144. See Two Bears Co. v. Am. State Ins. Co., No. 98-35407, 1999 WL 390922,
at *1 (9th Cir. May 24, 1999) (explaining that for this reason, and because of defense
counsel’s ethical constraints, Oregon law does not grant insureds a right to independent
counsel); Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 975 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Haw. 1999)
(noting that an insurer is estopped from denying coverage when it defends in such a
manner as to seriously prejudice the insured).
145. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 433 F.3d at 373; Delmonte, 975 P.2d at 1174.
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because the lawsuits they defend for their insureds typically do not
involve coverage issues, and therefore it is usually the insurers’ money
alone that is at stake. In contrast, many insureds do not have the same
knowledge of counsel’s competence or skills or are not as adept at
evaluating lawyers’ capabilities. Finally, unless and until an insurer
actually denies coverage, it remains the insurer’s money that is at stake.
In fact, insurers routinely indemnify insureds in cases defended under a
reservation of rights, either because the coverage defenses that initially
drove the reservation do not develop or because indemnifying the insured is
preferable from a business standpoint.
Although it is generally reasonable to allow an insurer to appoint
independent counsel for its insured as long as the insurer does so honestly
and objectively, an insurer cannot be permitted to select as independent
counsel a lawyer it employs as staff counsel or who practices in a
captive law firm that the insurer controls.146 It is simply impossible to
describe an insurance company employee as “independent” of the
insurer, no matter how conscientious or honorable the employed lawyer
may be. For that matter, no prudent insurer should want to appoint one
of its employed lawyers as independent counsel for an insured out of the
legitimate concern that the attendant appearance of impropriety will
spawn bad faith or breach of contract allegations.
If a court does not trust an insurer to designate independent counsel, a
reasonable second option is for the insured to select independent counsel
with the insurer’s consent.147 The insurer must act reasonably in approving
or disapproving the insured’s choice of independent counsel.148 If the
insurer exercises its veto power over the insured’s choice, it must have a
good reason for doing so.149 An insurer that unreasonably refuses to
consent to the insured’s choice of counsel risks breaching its duty to
defend. This approach gives the insured a high level of confidence that
its defense counsel are truly independent from the insurer while at the
same time protecting the insurer’s interests in having the case defended

146. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. A & M Assocs., Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.R.I.
2002).
147. See, e.g., Maddox v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 01-1264, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26686, at *10 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2002) (permitting insured to select
counsel but allowing insurer the right to veto the insured’s choice “with good reason”);
Ctr. Found. v. Chi. Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 13, 21 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that insurer’s
approval of independent counsel appointed by insured could not be “unreasonably
withheld” (quoting Emp’rs Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 404 (R.I. 1968), abrogated
on other grounds by Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1995))).
148. Ctr. Found., 278 Cal. Rptr. at 21 (agreeing that the insurer had a right to
approve counsel retained by the insured “provided that such approval was not
unreasonably withheld”).
149. Maddox, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26686, at *10.
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by capable lawyers who are not antagonistic toward it. In some cases,
insurers may prefer this approach over appointing independent counsel
themselves. The advantage to an insurer in this approach is that it
reduces the likelihood of a dispute over the selection of independent
counsel and minimizes the prospect that the insured will later allege bad
faith or premise an estoppel argument on the theory—whether meritorious
or not—that independent counsel somehow favored the insurer in
conducting the defense.
Next, there is the current majority rule, which vests the insured with
sole discretion in selecting independent counsel, qualified by the insured’s
duty of good faith and fair dealing.150 Following this approach, an
insured may voluntarily decide to work with the insurer to select mutually
agreeable independent counsel, but it is not required to do so.151 The
insured’s duty of good faith and fair dealing requires it to select as
independent counsel “an experienced attorney qualified to present a
meaningful defense” and committed to “ethical billing practices.”152
Courts embracing this approach reason that it fairly balances the
insured’s interests against the insurer’s by guaranteeing to the insured
counsel of undivided loyalty while alleviating the insurer’s concerns
over competence and cost.153 The current majority rule is perhaps not so
different from the second alternative outlined above because an insurer
that reasonably believed that independent counsel selected by the
insured was unqualified or insisted on unreasonable billing practices or
rates, for example, would plainly have the right to refuse that lawyer on
the basis that the insured had not exercised good faith in making the
selection.
An insured’s right to select independent counsel might also be
qualified by the insured’s contractual duty to cooperate with the insurer.
Cooperation clauses in liability insurance policies obligate insureds to
cooperate in the defense of suits against them as a condition of receiving
policy benefits. An insurer’s defense under a reservation of rights does
not excuse an insured’s duty to cooperate.154 The duty to cooperate is
150. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1121
(Alaska 1993).
151. Nowacki v. Federated Realty Grp., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1109 (E.D. Wis.
1999) (interpreting Wisconsin law).
152. Ctr. Found., 278 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
153. CHI of Alaska, Inc., 844 P.2d at 1121.
154. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Am. Pride Bldg. Co., 601 F.3d 1143, 1149–50 (11th
Cir. 2010) (applying Florida law); see, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Frankel Enters., Inc.,
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thus a valid basis for requiring the insured to select competent counsel
satisfactory to the insurer even though the insurer does not have the right
to control the insured’s defense in other respects.
It is important to recognize that all of the foregoing approaches are
default mechanisms. An insured may voluntarily waive a conflict of
interest155 and accept defense counsel assigned by the insurer.156 Insurers
and insureds are free to select independent counsel cooperatively or to
formulate other approaches to choosing counsel. For example, an insurer
might submit a list of lawyers to the insured, who could then select one.
Alternatively, the insured might propose a list of lawyers to the insurer,
which could then select one. Either approach allows the party making
the selection to satisfy itself as to the lawyer’s suitability for the
independent counsel role. Furthermore, some insurance companies now
include selection of counsel clauses in their policies or endorse them
on.157 Such clauses should generally be enforceable.158
In addition, cases may sometimes be characterized by facts or
circumstances that require specifically crafted approaches. For example,
an insurer may decline to defend an insured for legitimate reasons only
to later (1) have to change its position based on the revelation of new
facts, or (2) have a defense obligation imposed on it by a court. In the
meantime, the insured will have engaged defense counsel of its own
choosing. Depending on the amount of time that has passed between
counsel’s retention and the insurer’s assumption of the defense, it may
be reasonable to permit the insured to retain its chosen counsel given
that the insured’s lawyer is already immersed in the case and is familiar
with all of its aspects.159

509 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that insured breached duty to
cooperate in case being defended under a reservation of rights), aff’d, 287 F. App’x 775
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
155. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Olsak, 908 N.E.2d 1091, 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(noting that a conflict of interest “may be resolved by full disclosure and consent of the
parties”).
156. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 347 A.2d 842, 854 (Md. 1975), modified on
other grounds by Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 651 A.2d 859 (Md. 1995); see also
14 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 202:35, at 202-89
(2005) (citing Brohawn, 347 A.2d 842).
157. See, e.g., JACO Envtl., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. 2:09-cv0145, 2009 WL 1591340, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2009) (quoting such a clause).
158. See, e.g., N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738 F.2d 61, 65–66 (2d
Cir. 1984) (enforcing such a clause in applying New York law).
159. See, e.g., Purcigliotti v. Risk Enter. Mgmt. Ltd., 658 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297–98
(App. Div. 1997); Sturt v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 761 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001) (affirming trial court fee award where defense counsel hired by the insurer asked
the insured’s lawyer to remain in the case because of the lawyer’s long involvement in it
and a looming trial date).
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III. THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE
A principal concern for insurers required to provide independent
counsel of an insured’s choosing is the cost of those legal services. This
is a recurring source of controversy because lawyers who are selected by
insureds often charge much higher hourly rates than those an insurer
pays its panel counsel.160 An insurer’s obligation to pay independent
counsel clearly does not transform its policy into a blank check.161 Even
when independent counsel control the defense, an insurer is only obligated
to pay reasonable defense costs.162 This requirement protects insurers
against “runaway legal fees.”163 The clear challenge for courts is defining
reasonable in this context.
A. Reasonableness Under Rules of Professional Conduct
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer
shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee
or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”164 The rule applies regardless
of who pays the lawyer’s fees. Rule 1.5(a) lists eight factors to consider
when weighing the reasonableness of a lawyer’s fee:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

160. See, e.g., Photomedex, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 07-0025,
2008 WL 324025, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2008) (involving independent counsel who
charged hourly rates for two partners at $685 and $360, respectively, compared with
insurer’s regular rate of $175 per hour).
161. William T. Barker, Insurer Control of Defense: Reservations of Rights and
Right to Independent Counsel, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 16, 26 (2004); see also United Pac. Ins.
Co. v. Hall, 245 Cal. Rptr. 99, 102 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that insured’s right to
independent counsel at insurer’s expense “does not delegate to [independent] counsel a
meal ticket immunized from judicial review for reasonableness”).
162. Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 172 F.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 1999); Hartford Cas.
Ins. Co. v. A & M Assocs., Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 2d 84, 93 (D.R.I. 2002) (citing Magoun v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 195 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Mass. 1964)); MetLife Capital Corp. v.
Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 100 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.P.R. 2000); CHI of Alaska, Inc.
v. Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Alaska 1993); IMC Global v. Cont’l
Ins. Co., 883 N.E.2d 68, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Nisson v. Am. Home Assurance Co.,
917 P.2d 488, 490–91 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996).
163. MetLife Capital Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 96.
164. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2010).
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(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.165

No single factor controls the reasonableness of a lawyer’s fee,166 and not
all factors are relevant in all cases.167 The weight to be assigned to any
given factor depends on the facts of the particular case.168 Moreover, the
Rule 1.5(a) factors are not exclusive.169 Additionally, in analyzing the
reasonableness of legal fees, courts should consider the engagement as a
whole.170 Regardless, the burden of establishing the reasonableness of a
fee rests with the lawyer.171
Most liability insurers employ outside counsel guidelines to which
their panel counsel are required to adhere.172 These guidelines typically
address defense counsel’s billing practices and may provide, for example,
that the insurer will not pay for intraoffice conferences, legal research in
excess of two or three hours absent prior approval, or tasks that the
insurer considers clerical, or the guidelines may limit the number of
lawyers for which the insurer will pay to appear at depositions and
hearings.173 Whatever the merits of such requirements, an insurer’s
preemptive refusal to pay for activities in whole or part does not alone
render the legal fees charged for those activities unreasonable. Independent
counsel may perform activities contrary to insurers’ billing guidelines if
they believe them necessary, and an insurer may decline to pay for those

165. Id.
166. Rodriguez v. Ancona, 868 A.2d 807, 814 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Heng v.
Rotech Med. Corp., 2006 ND 176, ¶ 30, 720 N.W.2d 54, 65.
167. Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 969 A.2d 1080, 1088 (N.J. 2009).
168. McCabe v. Arcidy, 635 A.2d 446, 452 (N.H. 1993); In re Malone, 886 A.2d
181, 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
169. See, e.g., Nunn Law Office v. Rosenthal, 905 N.E.2d 513, 520–21 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009); Diamond Point Plaza Ltd. P’ship v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 929 A.2d 932,
955 (Md. 2007); Twp. of W. Orange, 969 A.2d at 1088.
170. See Weatherford v. Price, 532 S.E.2d 310, 315 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000);
Alexander v. Inman, 903 S.W.2d 686, 695 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Lawyer Disciplinary
Bd. v. Morton, 569 S.E.2d 412, 417 (W. Va. 2002).
171. Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit, P.C. v. Rossiello, 911 N.E.2d 1180, 1187 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009); Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell v. Granger, 2006-859, p. 7 (La. App.
3 Cir. 12/29/06); 947 So. 2d 835, 842; In re Dawson, 2000-NMSC-024, ¶ 12, 129 N.M.
369, 8 P.3d 856; Bass v. Rose, 609 S.E.2d 848, 853 (W. Va. 2004).
172. Ian A. Stewart & Gregory K. Lee, Considerations Presented by Litigation
Management Guidelines, FOR DEF., June 2009, at 70, 70 (stating that such guidelines
improve “quality, uniformity and cost control”).
173. Douglas R. Richmond, The Business and Ethics of Liability Insurers’ Efforts
To Manage Legal Care, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 57, 95 (1997); Amy S. Moats, Note, A
Bermuda Triangle in the Tripartite Relationship: Ethical Dilemmas Raised by Insurers’
Billing and Litigation Management Guidelines, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 525, 538 (2003).
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activities or pay under protest, thus framing a dispute for resolution by a
court or other neutral third party. The mere fact that an insurer does not
want to pay for independent counsel’s activities, however, does not
alone determine the reasonableness of the associated fees.
B. The Crux of the Reasonableness Issue: Fee Comparisons
As noted above, a key factor when evaluating the reasonableness of
legal fees is “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.”174 As frequent and sophisticated purchasers of legal services
that tend to supply their panel firms with respectable volumes of business,
insurance companies generally negotiate hourly rates below what those
law firms typically charge their other commercial clients. Thus, an
insurer usually considers the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar services to be the discounted hourly rates to which its panel
counsel have agreed. After all, that is the hourly rate the insurer would
pay to defend the insured but for the conflict of interest requiring
independent counsel.
Insurers often negotiate steep discounts with their panel counsel.
Proposed independent counsel may consider the insurer’s discounted
hourly rate to be acceptable, but it is equally likely they will not.
Lawyers proposed as independent counsel are generally not receiving
sufficient work from the insurer to justify a substantial rate reduction, if
any. They may have full workloads at their regular rates and thus feel
no need to accept a new engagement on less favorable terms. They may
also consider themselves to be more capable than the insurer’s panel
counsel. From their standpoint, the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar services is either the hourly rate they would normally
charge commercial clients to defend similar cases or the hourly rate
charged by lawyers at their level at peer law firms for similar
representations. One way or another, it is certainly not an “insurance
defense” rate.
The fact that an insurer’s panel counsel are compensated at a lower
rate does not compel the conclusion that higher rates proposed by
independent counsel are unreasonable.175 At least one court has held that
the reasonableness of independent counsel’s fees cannot be measured

174.
175.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3) (2010).
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 681 N.E.2d 552, 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
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solely by reference to an insurer’s panel counsel rates.176 Other courts
that have considered the issue, however, have been sympathetic to
insurers’ arguments that the reasonableness of legal fees charged or
proposed by independent counsel is appropriately measured by comparing
independent counsel’s fees with the fees the insurers would otherwise
pay panel counsel.177 That is the statutory approach employed in Alaska
and California.178 Although lawyers may never charge unreasonable
fees and clients cannot consent to unreasonable charges, insureds may
have reasons for paying their lawyers more generously than an objective
observer would conclude is appropriate under the circumstances.179
However valid those reasons may be, they do not control the analysis
where the fees are to be paid not by the insured but by a third party. The
third-party payor’s reasonable expectations must be taken into account
even if they are not fully satisfied. In any event, insureds do not have
the right to dictate to insurers the hourly rates they must pay independent
counsel.180
C. Analysis
Insureds clearly cannot dictate to insurers the rate at which they
compensate independent counsel. Insurers are bound only to pay
reasonable fees for independent counsel.181 In most cases, the insurer
and independent counsel selected by the insured will be able to negotiate
a reasonable fee agreement. After all, the lawyers proposed as independent
counsel surely want to represent the insured in the matter, and the insurer
just as certainly recognizes that if it acts unreasonably in engaging
independent counsel, it risks breaching its duty to defend the insured.182
But what of the occasional case in which the insurer and the lawyers
offered as independent counsel are unable to agree on compensation?

176. N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. R.H. Realty Trust, 941 N.E.2d 688, 691–93 & n.13 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2011) (explaining why panel counsel rates may not be reasonable both in theory
and as a matter of proof in this case).
177. See, e.g., Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 89C-SE-187-1CV, 1990 WL 127826, at *2–3 n.3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1990) (requiring
independent counsel chosen by insured to accept insurer’s hourly rate caps); Aquino v.
State Farm Ins. Cos., 793 A.2d 824, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (noting that
independent counsel might be required to accept less than the standard hourly rate given
discounted rates normally paid by insurers, which may be determined by the court).
178. ALASKA STAT. § 21.96.100(d) (2008); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(c) (West 2009).
179. Ctr. Found. v. Chi. Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 13, 21 n.11 (Ct. App. 1991).
180. Aquino, 793 A.2d at 832.
181. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2010).
182. See, e.g., Rector of St. Peter’s Church in Phila. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 97
F. App’x 374, 378 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that insurer’s offer to engage law firm on
terms that the firm was unwilling to accept breached duty to defend).
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Ultimately, a court or other neutral third party will have to determine if
the legal fees sought by independent counsel are reasonable and thus
whether the insurer must pay them.183 In this context, as elsewhere, the
reasonableness of lawyers’ fees should be determined principally by the
factors specified in Rule 1.5(a). Which factors apply, and the weights to
be assigned them, will depend on the case.
In examining the Rule 1.5(a) factors, several require elaboration,
starting with “the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
services properly.”184 In short, not all cases are alike. The “novelty and
difficulty” of a matter may be either factual or legal.185 A catastrophic
injury, wrongful death, or professional liability case, for instance, is
much different from a slip-and-fall or automobile case involving minor
injuries. Insurers obligated to engage independent counsel chosen by an
insured must acknowledge that the defense of difficult matters generally
requires experienced and skilled lawyers and that such lawyers can
command greater rates than lawyers who handle relatively minor or
simple cases.186 Fortunately for all concerned, liability insurers, as
professional litigants, understand this quite well. Most insurers factor
the nature of a case into their defense assignments, and they typically
have strata of law firms on their panels. Thus, and by way of example,
although firms A and B on an insurer’s panel may receive simple cases
to defend at very low hourly rates, firms C and D are assigned complex
matters or large losses and are compensated at higher hourly rates.
This leads smoothly into the next important factor, which is “the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.”187 The
“locality” is the geographic area from which it would be reasonable to
obtain counsel, and it is not necessarily limited to a particular city,

183. See generally Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 2009-656, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir.
12/9/09); 26 So. 3d 886, 892–93 (finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing insurer’s request to impose a fee cap on independent counsel but stated instead
that, if needed, it would determine reasonableness of fees based on evidence presented at
an adversary hearing).
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(1).
185. West v. Club at Spanish Peaks, LLC, 2008 MT 183, ¶ 100, 343 Mont. 434, 186
P.3d 1228.
186. See Cont’l Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 85-C-1165, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16133, at *19–20 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 1987) (justifying higher fees for counsel
selected by the insured based on the complexity and difficulty of the litigation).
187. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3) (2010).
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judicial district, or even a state.188 The baseline should be the rate the
insurer would pay one of its panel firms that it regularly uses in the
jurisdiction to defend a similar case. That rate may vary by the nature of
the litigation as explained above, but it still should be the insurer’s
customary rate that principally governs because that is the rate the
insurer would pay one of its panel firms were it allowed to appoint
counsel. Despite the conflict of interest, the case remains an insurance
defense representation when pricing similar legal services. The obvious
opposing argument—that a court should focus on the substantive nature
of the litigation when evaluating the cost of legal services rather than the
nature of the entity bearing the cost—is unpersuasive because liability
insurers defend cases involving most every substantive area of the law.
In any event, when evaluating the reasonableness of independent counsel’s
fees, the fact that lawyers picked as independent counsel normally charge
more for their services is immaterial, 189 as is the fact that the insured
agreed to pay independent counsel’s higher rate.190
On the other side of the coin, independent counsel who believe
themselves due an hourly rate higher than the rate the insurer normally
pays should be prepared to establish why that is so according to the Rule
1.5(a) factors. The best argument for independent counsel is that unlike
the insurer’s panel counsel, they neither maintain nor desire a continuing
relationship with the insurer that would justify a substantial downward
departure from their standard rates.191 In fact, they might understandably
argue, it is precisely that professional separation that qualifies them to
serve as independent counsel. Furthermore, independent counsel might
contend that asking them to accept a discounted hourly rate is
unreasonable because the “nature and length of [their] professional
relationship” with the insured enable them to defend the insured more
effectively and efficiently than the insurer’s panel counsel, who do not
188. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 185 P.3d 258, 262–63 (Idaho 2008).
189. See Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 958 A.2d 1195, 1214 (Conn. 2008)
(discussing the use of local market rates generally, despite what lawyers typically charge
for their services).
190. In re Malone, 886 A.2d 181, 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (stating that
a claimant seeking attorney’s fees from government agency was not entitled to be
reimbursed for her lawyer’s high hourly rate “merely because she signed a retainer
agreement to that effect”).
191. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(6) (2010) (listing as a factor
“the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client”); see, e.g., Oscar
W. Larson Co. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 458, 462 (W.D. Mich. 1993)
(comparing insurance defense rates with higher hourly rates “for legal services provided
to a corporate client on a temporary or ad hoc basis” and awarding rates higher than
those the insurer normally would have paid to defense counsel), aff’d, 64 F.3d 1010 (6th
Cir. 1995); N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. R.H. Realty Trust, 941 N.E.2d 688, 692 (Mass. App. Ct.
2011) (explaining why hourly rate greater than insurer’s panel counsel rate was reasonable).
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enjoy the same familiarity.192 The familiarity argument will seldom be
compelling, however, because in most cases any efficiency that might
be achieved through an ongoing relationship will not materially
affect or benefit the defense as a whole and therefore will be minor when
compared with the savings achieved through the insurer’s typical hourly
rate discount.
All parties must accept certain realities here. From the insured’s
perspective, it may not be able to be represented by its chosen counsel if
those lawyers and the insurer cannot agree on reasonable compensation.
The insured should be willing to accept substitute counsel as long as
those lawyers are capable and loyal. An insured denied its first choice of
counsel has not been denied the right to select counsel altogether. If the
insured insists on representation by its chosen counsel, it may be
required to pay the difference between what the insurer is willing to pay
and what the lawyers are willing to accept as fees. Independent counsel
must understand that an insurance policy is not a blank check.193 If they
want to represent the insured, they may have to compromise on
compensation. There is no requirement that they do so, of course, because
they can decline the representation if they think it will be unprofitable.
Their willingness to bend may depend on their desire to establish or
maintain a relationship with the insured, or on practice-related benefits
that attend the representation. Finally, from the insurer’s standpoint, it is
free to negotiate the best deal it can achieve with the lawyers selected by
the insured. If those lawyers are unreasonable or are simply unwilling to
compromise and the insurer cannot come to terms with them, the insurer
may ask the insured to propose different counsel. The insurer must be
flexible in its expectations with respect to independent counsel’s fees,
however, lest its stubbornness cause it to breach its duty to defend.194
One solution if the parties cannot agree on independent counsel’s
compensation is for the insurer to initially pay independent counsel what
it considers to be a reasonable hourly rate to defend the insured, with the
understanding that the insured or independent counsel will later seek to
recover the difference between that rate and the higher rate sought by

192. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(6).
193. See sources cited supra note 161.
194. Rector of St. Peter’s Church in Phila. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 97 F. App’x
374, 378 (3d Cir. 2004).
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independent counsel.195 The parties could also agree that the insurer will
initially pay the rate demanded by independent counsel and later seek to
recoup the difference between that rate and the lower rate offered by the
insurer through arbitration or separate litigation. Arbitration would seem
to be the logical forum for resolving such a dispute, but litigation is an
option. Both approaches allow the insurance company to satisfy its duty
to defend without being exploited in the process. The second alternative
is arguably preferable because it places responsibility for the defense on
the insurer, which is consistent with its contractual duty to defend, but
both are generally fair. Regardless, the burden of establishing the
reasonableness of independent counsel’s fees rests with either the
insured or independent counsel.196 This allocation of responsibility is
consistent with the resolution of attorney’s fees controversies in other
areas of the law. It is certainly not the insurer’s burden to prove that
independent counsel’s fees are unreasonable.197 The insurer must, however,
state its objections to independent counsel’s fees “with particularity and
clarity.”198
IV. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INSURER
Once independent counsel are engaged, it is natural to examine their
relationship with the insurers paying their fees. In most cases in which
insurers defend insureds with panel counsel and control the defense, the
defense lawyer has two clients—the insurer and the insured.199 This is
the well-known “dual client doctrine,” under which the defense lawyer
owes fiduciary duties to both the insurer and insured.200 For example, a
defense lawyer in a dual client relationship owes the insured and the
insurer equal duties of loyalty. Understandably, then, a defense lawyer
in a dual client relationship cannot be involved in disagreements or
195. See Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 172 F.3d 601, 605–06 (8th Cir. 1999)
(discussing a similar approach where the court required the insurer to reimburse the
insured).
196. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 771 F.2d 579, 582 (1st Cir. 1985)
(calling it “obvious that the party claiming such expenditures has the burden of proving
them, including the burden of proving whether the fees were in fact reasonable”); see,
e.g., Photomedex, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 07-0025, 2008 WL
324025, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2008) (denying insured summary judgment on
reasonableness of independent counsel’s fees where insured provided no supporting
evidence).
197. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d at 582 (assigning the burden of persuasion
to the insured).
198. Pfeifer v. Sentry Ins., 745 F. Supp. 1434, 1443 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
199. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 17, § 114, at 887 (describing this view as the
majority rule).
200. Id. (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof’l Law Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 570, 575 (Ct. App. 1991)).
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disputes between the insured and insurer, regardless of whether those
controversies involve coverage, settlement, or any other issue. An insurer
that shares an attorney-client relationship with a defense lawyer has all
the privileges and rights and is owed all the duties that come with client
status. But that is not the independent counsel model, which establishes
the insured as the defense lawyer’s sole client. The independent counsel
model requires that the defense lawyer be loyal only to the insured and
mandates that the defense lawyer be free from the insurer’s control and
influence.201
So what, then, of the relationship, if any, between the insurer and
independent counsel? Is the insurer anything other than a third-party
payor of independent counsel’s legal fees? The answers to those questions
broadly encompasses four issues: (1) independent counsel’s duty to
communicate, consult, and cooperate with the insurer in defending the
insured, (2) independent counsel’s ability to take the insured’s side in
disagreements between the insured and the insurer, (3) independent
counsel’s potential malpractice liability to the insurer should counsel’s
conduct of the defense fall below the standard of care and the insurer be
damaged as a result, and (4) the insurer’s potential vicarious liability for
independent counsel’s misconduct.
A. Independent Counsel’s Duty To Communicate, Consult, and
Cooperate with the Insurer in the Defense
An insurer divorced from its right to control an insured’s defense by a
conflict of interest remains heavily invested in the case. The insurer is
certainly interested in having independent counsel defend the insured
effectively and efficiently because the insurer (1) remains responsible for
defense costs and (2) may ultimately be required to pay any settlement or
judgment, the amount of which will almost certainly be influenced by
the quality of the defense effort. The insurer retains the right to settle
the case at its expense and to refuse payment of any settlement struck by
the insured or independent counsel without its approval.202 An insurer
201. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. A & M Assocs., Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90
(D.R.I. 2002) (explaining the independent counsel construct); Mosier v. S. Cal.
Physicians Ins. Exch., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 564 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting several cases
in explaining this principle).
202. See, e.g., Low v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 761, 772 (Ct. App.
2003) (enforcing “no voluntary payments” provision where insured settled after tendering
defense and insurer did not refuse to defend); Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Ins.
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that attempts to negotiate the settlement of a case defended by
independent counsel does not thereby assume control of the defense.203
An insurer may decide to withdraw its reservation of rights, assume
control of the insured’s defense, and indemnify the insured. Indeed, the
insurer may be required to change position and defend and indemnify
the insured without qualification based on facts revealed in the course of
the litigation. In summary, the insurer’s exercise of its own rights, as
well as its fulfillment of its duties to its insured, all depend on the insurer’s
receiving “full and timely information” from independent counsel.204
Despite the insurer’s reservation of rights, the insured is generally
obligated to cooperate with the insurer in its defense.205 Independent
counsel, as the insured’s agents,206 must carry out the insured’s duty to
cooperate to the extent they are called upon to do so.
For these reasons, an insurer can reasonably insist that independent
counsel fully inform it of factual and legal developments related to the
defense, consult with it on defense strategy and tactics,207 and consult
with it before incurring major expenses in the course of the defense.208
The insurer’s advice, insight, or suggestions may prove valuable to the
insured. As long as the consultations do not reveal confidential information
Exch., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 891 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that insurer that appointed
independent counsel for insured and surrendered control of the defense was not obligated
to fund settlement to which insured unilaterally agreed); W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 82 (Ct. App. 1995) (affirming insurer’s right to
settle case defended by independent counsel).
203. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 28 F.3d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1994);
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 630 F. Supp. 2d 158, 169 (D. Mass. 2009).
204. Barker, supra note 161, at 25.
205. An insurer’s reservation of rights does not eliminate the insured’s duty to
cooperate because a defense under reservation is not a breach of contract that would
excuse the insured’s performance. That essential principle remains true where a conflict
of interest necessitates the appointment of independent counsel. James M. Fischer, The
Professional Obligations of Cumis Counsel Retained for the Policyholder but Not
Subject to Insurer Control, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 173, 185–86 (2008). The
insured remains obligated to cooperate in its defense in all respects, except that in this
context, the duty to cooperate cannot require the insured to share with the insurer
information that the insurer could use to defeat coverage. But see Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 327–31 (Ill. 1991) (holding that
cooperation clause in policy overrides the insured’s attorney-client privilege and work
product immunity).
206. Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng’g, B.V., 218 P.3d 1150, 1170 (Idaho 2009) (“[T]he
relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency in which the client is the
principal and the attorney is the agent.”); Spees v. Ky. Legal Aid, 274 S.W.3d 447, 448
(Ky. 2009) (“An attorney acts as an agent of his client.” (citing Clark v. Burden, 917
S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1996))).
207. Barker, supra note 161, at 25; cf. In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct & Insurer
Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, 2000 MT 110, ¶¶ 38–39, 299 Mont. 321, 2 P.3d
806 (requiring consultation where insured is sole client of defense lawyer hired by
insurer).
208. 1 WINDT, supra note 27, § 4:22, at 4-190.
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held by the insured that might be used to defeat coverage, allowing the
insurer to consult on the defense cannot harm the insured. If the
insurer’s suggestions and advice are not advantageous, the insured and
independent counsel are free to ignore them. Having lost the right to
control the defense, the insurer cannot demand that the insured or
independent counsel heed its advice or suggestions.209 As for consultation
on major expenses, an insurer has no obligation to pay for services or
items that “are overpriced or inappropriate,” and no matter how wellintentioned independent counsel may be, they are not the sole arbiter of
the reasonableness of all defense expenditures.210 In addition, advance
notice of substantial expenses may cause an insurer to explore settlement
on a cost of defense basis or withdraw its reservation of rights in order to
regain control of the defense, both of which benefit the insured. At the
same time, insurers must be reasonable when evaluating the desirability
or worth of major defense expenditures on which they are consulted.
In many cases, a defense lawyer will be deemed to share an attorneyclient relationship with an insurer not because they expressly so agreed
but because the defense lawyer gave the insurer legal advice relating to
the defense on which the insurer relied, thus creating a de facto attorneyclient relationship.211 That is not the situation, however, where independent
counsel consult with an insurer.212 First, and as a practical matter, the
insurer clearly understands that independent counsel cannot represent it
in the matter because of the underlying conflict of interest. 213 Any
communication or consultation between independent counsel and the
insurer is purely informational.214 Second, in some jurisdictions the
209. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. A & M Assocs., Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90
(D.R.I. 2002) (explaining that the insurer cannot control the litigation); Jacob v. W. Bend
Mut. Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that unless the
insurer is willing to accept coverage, it has no authority to affect independent counsel’s
defense of the insured).
210. Barker, supra note 161, at 26.
211. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 17, at 888.
212. Mosier v. S. Cal. Physicians Ins. Exch., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 564 (Ct. App.
1998) (quoting First Pac. Networks, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 163 F.R.D. 574, 579 (N.D.
Cal. 1995)).
213. Bell Lavalin, Inc. v. Simcoe & Erie Gen. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir.
1995). Similarly, the fact that a lawyer serving as independent counsel furnishes an
insurer with status reports or confidential information in furtherance of the insured’s
defense does not create a duty of loyalty owed by the lawyer to the insurer, nor does such
activity create a conflict of interest for the lawyer. Id.
214. Mosier, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564 (quoting First Pac. Networks, Inc., 163 F.R.D.
at 579).
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conflict justifying the appointment of independent counsel prevents the
formation of an attorney-client relationship between independent counsel
and the insurer as a matter of law.215
Most insurers have litigation management guidelines—commonly
referred to as “outside counsel guidelines”—that they expect defense
counsel to follow when defending their insureds.216 Insurers’ outside
counsel guidelines call for case budgets, set reporting intervals or
requirements, mandate preapproval of certain activities or expenses, and
the like. 217 Even in cases in which the insurer controls the defense,
however, defense lawyers cannot allow an insurer’s guidelines to
interfere with their own professional judgment about how to best
represent the insured.218 That is doubly true where the insurer has lost
the right to control the defense and the insured is defended by
independent counsel. Still, there is nothing improper about an insurer’s
requiring independent counsel to adhere to its outside counsel guidelines
as long as the guidelines do not interfere with or unreasonably restrict
independent counsel’s professional judgment or otherwise prejudice the
insured’s defense.219 In the event that adherence to an insurer’s outside
counsel guidelines might impair the insured’s defense, then obviously
independent counsel need not follow them unless instructed by the
insured to do so.220 That instruction will likely never come.
It is critically important that whether required by outside counsel
guidelines or simply requested by the insurer, independent counsel keep
the insurer informed of the status of the case being defended and
developments in that litigation. Independent counsel should not resist
insurers’ requests for information as long as they do not seek
information relevant to coverage. The insurer is entitled to information
relevant to the defense by virtue of the insured’s duty to cooperate.221
Except for information relating to coverage, independent counsel cannot
invoke work product immunity or the attorney-client privilege to deny
the insurer information it needs to analyze or evaluate the insured’s
215. See id.; see also Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress, 163 Ohio
App. 3d 336, 2005-Ohio-4799, 837 N.E.2d 1215, at ¶¶ 15–25 (concluding that conflict of
interest precluded existence of attorney-client relationship between the insurer and the
lawyer it hired to defend the insured).
216. Richmond, supra note 173, at 95.
217. Id.; Moats, supra note 173, at 538.
218. Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 889 & n.9
(Ct. App. 1998); In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct & Insurer Imposed Billing Rules &
Procedures, 2000 MT 110, ¶¶ 44–51, 299 Mont. 321, 2 P.3d 806; State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 627–28 (Tex. 1998); Barefield v. DPIC Cos., 600
S.E.2d 256, 269–70 (W. Va. 2004).
219. See Richmond, supra note 173, at 95.
220. Dynamic Concepts, Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 889 n.9.
221. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 20, § 30:21, at 368, 372.
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defense.222 Independent counsel should not be concerned that sharing
information with the insurer will be discoverable by the plaintiff because
even though the insurer is not a client, communications between them
are immune from discovery under the work product doctrine. Although
the insurer and insured are adversarial with respect to the insurer’s
indemnity obligation, they are united in interest insofar as defeating the
plaintiff’s suit against the insured is concerned. Thus, independent
counsel’s communications with the insurer, although made to a third
party, are not made to an adversary or a conduit to an adversary and
accordingly retain their work product immunity.223 Depending on the
facts and the jurisdiction, the communications may also be shielded from
discovery by the plaintiff by the attorney-client privilege and any
insurer-insured privilege.224 If nothing else, the attorney-client privilege
certainly should extend to independent counsel’s communications with
the insurer under the “common interest” doctrine.225

222. Indep. Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1365–
66 (D.D.C. 1986); Northwood Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co.,
161 F.R.D. 293, 297–99 (E.D. Pa. 1995); 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 20, § 30:21, at
372.
223. See DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LITIGATION
290 (2011) (discussing waiver of work product immunity); 1 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET
AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 2:20, at 2-62, -63 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining waiver of
work product immunity through disclosure to a third party).
224. See Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing attorney-client privilege); Pietro v.
Marriott Senior Living Servs., Inc., 810 N.E.2d 217, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (extending
attorney-client privilege to include insurer-insured privilege); May Dep’t Stores Co. v.
Ryan, 699 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing insurer-insured privilege);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134 cmt. f (2000) (stating
that regardless of whether an insurer and defense lawyer share an attorney-client
relationship, their communications “concerning such matters as progress reports, case
evaluations, and settlement should be regarded as privileged and otherwise immune from
discovery by the claimant or another party to the proceeding”).
225. Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 567, 571–73
(E.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing federal law and applying common interest doctrine).

893

RICHMOND POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

9/23/2011 2:50 PM

B. Independent Counsel’s Ability To Side with the Insured
Against the Insurer
When an insurer appoints counsel for its insured in a case in which
there is no conflict of interest and the insurer controls the defense, the
lawyer hired by the insurer has a single role—defending the insured
against the allegations made by plaintiff.226 That is the sole purpose for
which the lawyer is representing the insured. An insurer has no
authority, duty, or desire to provide a lawyer to advise the insured on
coverage.227 If defense lawyers competent to advise insureds on coverage
did so, and the insurer was also a client, they would plainly suffer a
conflict of interest.228 If lawyers had thought to structure the representation
so that insureds were their sole client, they would probably still be
reluctant to advise insureds on coverage because they would have to
know that the insurer would not pay them for that time on the basis that
the services were beyond the scope of the representation. Thus, if
insureds want coverage advice in a typical case, they must engage coverage
counsel at their own expense.
Understandably, an insured in a case tinged by a conflict may require
coverage advice. As in any case, the insured is free to engage counsel at
its expense to provide such advice. But may independent counsel advise
the insured on coverage? Assuming that independent counsel do not
share an attorney-client relationship with the insurer in unrelated
matters—as they well might in jurisdictions that allow insurers to
appoint independent counsel—ethics rules are no impediment to
independent counsel’s advising insureds on coverage.229 Some cases
state that lawyers serving as independent counsel cannot be “involved in
coverage disputes,”230 but it is unclear whether these courts mean that
independent counsel are prohibited from advising the insurer on
coverage, as is unquestionably true, or whether they must avoid coverage
questions altogether. Or perhaps these courts mean that independent
counsel can advise the insured on coverage questions but cannot
represent the insured in actual or threatened coverage litigation with the
insurer arising out of the same case they are defending.

226. 1 WINDT, supra note 27, § 4:19, at 4-168; Leo P. Martinez, Coverage Advice:
The Missing Piece of the Cumis Puzzle, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 63, 74 (2008).
227. Martinez, supra note 226, at 74.
228. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2010) (stating that a
lawyer has a concurrent conflict of interest where the representation of one client is
directly adverse to another client).
229. See id. R. 1.7(a) (governing concurrent client conflicts of interest).
230. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. A & M Assocs., Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.R.I.
2002).
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Although there is no ethical prohibition on independent counsel’s
advising insureds on coverage issues, that does not mean that insurers
must accept such arrangements. Coverage advice is clearly beyond the
scope of the insurer’s duty to defend, which of course underpins
independent counsel’s involvement in the case, and it is outside the
scope of the representation for which the insurer has agreed to pay.231
For these reasons, the insurer can have no obligation to compensate
independent counsel for any time spent on coverage issues. Moreover,
an insurer is within its rights to insist that lawyers serving as independent
counsel not advise insureds on coverage. An insurer required to accept
independent counsel “is under a duty to provide only an impartial
defense—not to sacrifice its own interests.”232 If independent counsel
were to go beyond rendering advice or opinions and perhaps represent
the insured in a coverage or bad faith dispute with the insurer or attempt
to slant coverage in the insured’s favor in the course of the defense, the
insurer would be within its rights to reject those lawyers or demand that
the insured swiftly replace them.233 An insurer cannot reasonably be
expected to tolerate antagonistic behavior by the same lawyers with
whom it must interact in their capacity as defense counsel.234 This is
true even when the insurer’s interactions with independent counsel are
limited.235
C. Independent Counsel’s Potential Malpractice
Liability to the Insurer
Insurance defense counsel are increasingly the target of legal
malpractice lawsuits by the insurers that hire them to defend their
231. But see James A. Brown & Shannon S. Holtzman, When the Carrier and Insured
Part Ways: The Insured’s Right to Independent Counsel, LA. B.J., June/July 2005, at 16,
18 (arguing that barring independent counsel from advising insureds on coverage
deprives insureds of adequate and complete defenses).
232. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 563 F. Supp. 187, 190 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
233. See, e.g., Maddox v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 01-1264, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26686, at *10 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2002) (allowing insurer to reject insured’s
chosen independent counsel where those lawyers intended to represent the insured in a
bad faith claim against the insurer and fostered an “extremely high level of acrimony”
with the insurer in the case they were defending); N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 563
F. Supp. at 190 n.1 (noting that insurer acted reasonably in refusing to approve
independent counsel who were hostile to it).
234. Maddox, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *10 n.6.
235. Id. (discussing interactions confined to billing).
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insureds. Most states that have considered the issue permit a liability
insurer to sue defense counsel for professional negligence in representing an
insured in an underlying action.236 Very few cases, however, involve
independent counsel.
Most suits against lawyers allege legal malpractice, professional
negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty. Legal malpractice plaintiffs
must prove that (1) their lawyers owed them a duty, (2) the lawyers
breached that duty, and (3) the breach proximately caused (4) actual
damages.237 Because a lawyer’s duty of care flows from the attorneyclient relationship, lawyers are generally liable for professional negligence
only to clients. This is the “strict privity rule.”238 A lawyer’s liability
for breach of fiduciary duty similarly requires proof of an attorney-client
relationship giving rise to a fiduciary duty, breach of that duty, and
actual damages proximately caused by the breach.239 Inasmuch as a
lawyer’s fiduciary duties flow from the attorney-client relationship, a
lawyer is generally liable exclusively to clients under this theory.
Courts are reluctant to expand a lawyer’s potential liability for
malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty to nonclients because doing so
could create potential conflicts of interest for lawyers and compromise
the attorney-client relationship with all of its attendant duties. Nonetheless,
lawyers may owe duties to nonclients in limited circumstances, as
where the nonclient is the direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s
services.240 Incidental beneficiary status, on the other hand, will not
support liability.241 Determining whether a nonclient is a direct and
intended beneficiary of a lawyer’s services is a fact-dependent inquiry.
In a typical insurance defense representation in which defense counsel
represent both the insured and the insurer, the insurer may be able to sue

236. William H. Black Jr. & Sean O. Mahoney, Legal Bases for Claims by Liability
Insurers Against Defense Counsel for Malpractice, BRIEF, Winter 2006, at 33.
237. Radiology Servs., P.C. v. Hall, 780 N.W.2d 17, 23 (Neb. 2010) (citing Wolski
v. Wandel, 746 N.W.2d 143 (Neb. 2008)); Davis v. Enget, 2010 ND 34, ¶ 7, 779 N.W.2d
126, 129 (citing Minn-Kota Ag Prods., Inc. v. Carlson, 2004 ND 145, ¶ 7, 684 N.W.2d
60).
238. Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St. 3d 226, 2008-Ohio-2012, 887
N.E.2d 1167, at ¶ 14; Friske v. Hogan, 2005 SD 70, ¶ 10, 698 N.W.2d 526, 529 (citing
Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 2002 SD 122, ¶ 30, 652 N.W.2d 756, 769); Johnson v.
Hart, 692 S.E.2d 239, 243 (Va. 2010).
239. Slovensky v. Friedman, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 72 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768 (Ct. App. 1995)); Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, ¶¶ 8–9, 194 P.3d 931 (quoting Kilpatrick v. Wiley,
Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
240. Perez v. Stern, 777 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Neb. 2010); Credit Union Cent. Falls v.
Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1272–73 (R.I. 2009).
241. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Cozen O’Connor, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 911, 918 (Ct. App. 2007);
In re Estate of Drwenski, 2004 WY 5, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 457, 462 (Wyo. 2004).

896

RICHMOND POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 48: 857, 2011]

9/23/2011 2:50 PM

Independent Counsel in Insurance
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the defense counsel directly based on their attorney-client relationship.242
The insurer will generally be able to demonstrate actual damages caused
by defense counsel’s malpractice because it will have paid the resulting
loss pursuant to its contractual duty to indemnify the insured. In the
independent counsel context, however, the insurer and defense lawyer
do not have an attorney-client relationship.243 An insurer’s ability to sue
independent counsel for legal malpractice is therefore restricted.
Although it was decided under California’s statutory scheme for
regulating independent counsel, Assurance Co. of America v. Haven244 is
an illustrative case. There, Assurance Company of America (ACA) sued
its insured’s independent counsel, Ronald Haven, for failing to timely or
satisfactorily raise valid legal defenses to the plaintiff’s claims against
the insured, forcing ACA to accept an unfavorable settlement offer on
the insured’s behalf.245 The Haven court found that the conflict of
interest necessitating Haven’s appointment as independent counsel
prohibited him from owing ACA a duty to “investigate, prepare, assert,
establish, or perform similar functions regarding a defense or position in
ACA’s favor.”246 ACA thus had no cause of action against Haven for
failing to assert the defenses at issue.247 As the court would later explain:
The need for [independent] counsel arises only when there is a conflict or
potential conflict of interest between the insured and the insurer. Ethical
dilemmas . . . preclude joint representation . . . (unless the insured waives its
right to independent counsel). For these reasons, there is no attorney-client
relationship between [independent] counsel and the insurer. To allow an insurer
to sue . . . [independent] counsel for negligence for failing to pursue or establish
a complete defense would undermine the very foundation of the [independent
counsel] doctrine, which contemplates a counsel independent of the insurer.248

ACA argued that its nonclient status did not bar recovery because
lawyers can be liable to nonclients if the harm caused by the lawyer’s
negligence is reasonably foreseeable.249 In the California cases recognizing
a lawyer’s duties to nonclients, however, the nonclients were either
242. Gen. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, Coyne & Savits, LLP, 357 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956–
57 (E.D. Va. 2005) (surveying cases from numerous jurisdictions and predicting Virginia
law).
243. Assurance Co. of Am. v. Haven, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (Ct. App. 1995).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 28.
246. Id. at 31.
247. Id. at 31–32.
248. Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 34.
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third-party beneficiaries of the lawyer’s services, relying on the lawyer’s
work, or to be influenced by it in some fashion.250 This was a material
distinction:
In contrast to the cases finding [a] duty in the nonclient situation, [independent]
counsel . . . is present in the litigation only because there is a conflict or potential
conflict of interest between the . . . client (the insured) and the nonclient (the
insurer). [Independent] counsel is present, in other words, because independence
from the nonclient (i.e., from the insurer) is needed. In determining whether an
attorney can be held negligently liable to a person other than the attorney’s
client, “the adverseness [between the person and the client] is the key variable
in [the] decision about whether a cause of action should be allowed.” By
definition, there is an element of adverseness between the [independent]
counsel’s client (the insured) and the nonclient (the insurer). These factors
weigh heavily against holding [independent] counsel negligently liable to an
insurer for failing to investigate, prepare, assert, establish or perform similar
functions regarding a defense or position in the insurer’s favor.251

In summary, the Haven court rejected ACA’s direct liability and thirdparty beneficiary theories against Haven for his negligence in failing to
raise the key defenses at issue.252 The court found for ACA on other
issues not relevant here.253
If the Haven court’s reasoning concerning ACA’s direct liability
theory is sound—there being no attorney-client relationship between
ACA and Haven—its rejection of ACA’s third-party beneficiary theory
is suspect. ACA was certainly relying on Haven to competently defend
its insured. Haven’s defense of the insured was bound to influence
ACA’s potential indemnity obligation. Any adversity between the
insured and ACA concerned coverage, but that issue would never have
to be reached if the plaintiff were defeated. Rather than being adverse,
at the relevant time and in the relevant aspect of the case, the insured and
ACA were aligned in interest; they both were vitally interested in
defeating the plaintiff. Even the adversity over coverage was potential
rather than actual. Indeed, despite its reservation of rights, ACA paid $1
million to settle the plaintiff’s claims against the inured.254 Furthermore,
and counterbalancing any adversity between Haven and ACA, recognizing
ACA’s legal malpractice claim against Haven would have promoted the
enforcement of Haven’s obligations to the insured.
Courts have permitted insurers to sue defense lawyers for malpractice
based on a third-party beneficiary theory in cases in which the insurer

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
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retained the defense lawyer.255 With respect to lawyers’ potential liability to
nonclients, section 51 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers provides that a lawyer owes a duty of care
(2) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer’s acquiescence) the lawyer’s client
invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision
of other legal services, and the nonclient so relies; and
(b) the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from
the lawyer to be entitled to protection;
(3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary
objectives of the representation that the lawyer’s services
benefit the nonclient;
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer’s performance
of obligations to the client; and
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those
obligations to the client unlikely.256

Section 51(2) seems to recognize an insurer’s right to sue independent
counsel as a third-party beneficiary of a lawyer’s services in a case in
which the insurer ultimately indemnified the insured notwithstanding its
initial reservation of rights. Proceeding through the section 51(2)
elements, the client (the insured) invited a nonclient (the insurer) to rely
on the lawyer’s (independent counsel’s) provision of legal services by
insisting on independent counsel. The insurer’s potential duty to indemnify
the insured and actual indemnity payment both draw the insurer close
enough to the insured to be entitled to protection. The potential adversity
between the insured and insurer over coverage does not alter the section
51(2) calculus.
In contrast, section 51(3), which courts often cite or quote when
evaluating insurers’ legal malpractice claims against defense counsel,257
is a tough sell in this context. This is because the lawyer hired as
independent counsel did not know that the client (the insured) primarily

255. See, e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Koeppel, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1293,
1301 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (predicting Florida law and recognizing both direct liability and
third-party beneficiary theories); State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Young, 490 F. Supp.
2d 741, 743–47 (N.D. W. Va. 2007) (applying West Virginia law and recognizing direct
duty and third-party beneficiary theories); Gen. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, Coyne & Savits,
LLP, 357 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957–58 (E.D. Va. 2005) (predicting Virginia law); Paradigm
Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, P.A., 24 P.3d 593, 599–602 (Ariz. 2001).
256. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000).
257. See, e.g., State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 743; Gen. Sec.
Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d at 958; Paradigm Ins. Co., 24 P.3d at 600.
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intended the lawyer’s services to benefit the nonclient (the insurer). As
a matter of fact, the insured intended no such thing—it intended
independent counsel’s services to benefit the insured alone.
Even if indemnifying insurers cannot sue independent counsel for
legal malpractice on a third-party beneficiary theory—as they should be
permitted to do—they may be able to pursue equitable subrogation
claims against the lawyers. 258 Equitable subrogation reflects the
principle that one who is obligated to indemnify another “is entitled to
the means of redress held by the party indemnified against the person
causing the loss.”259 Equitable subrogation promotes justice by assigning
the consequences of tortious conduct to the legally responsible party. In
this context, equitable subrogation allows the insurer to step into the
insured’s shoes to assert the insured’s rights against its allegedly
negligent lawyers.
Courts commonly invoke equitable subrogation to allow insurers to
sue defense counsel for legal malpractice,260 and there is no reason to
deviate from that course in the independent counsel context. Where an
insurer providing independent counsel indemnifies an insured for the
contested loss, negligent independent counsel may escape responsibility
for their conduct unless the insurer can pursue recovery from them
through equitable subrogation.261 The insured, having been indemnified
by the insurer, is neither inclined nor positioned to sue defense counsel.
The former observation is especially true where the insured selected
independent counsel and has an ongoing relationship with them. There
is no injustice in allowing an insurer allegedly damaged by independent
counsel’s negligence to sue those lawyers. In contrast, effectively
immunizing independent counsel for their negligence serves no one except
the errant lawyers, who receive a free pass purely by happenstance.
Looking at the bigger picture, ultimately forcing insured consumers to
absorb the cost of independent counsel’s malpractice by denying insurers a
right of equitable subrogation would be unwise public policy.

258. See, e.g., Kumar v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 854 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275–76 (App.
Div. 2008) (permitting insurer to sue defense lawyers with whom it did not have an
attorney-client relationship on an equitable subrogation theory).
259. Black & Mahoney, supra note 236, at 35.
260. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Birch, Stewart, Kolasch & Birch,
LLP, 379 F. Supp. 2d 183, 192–96 (D. Mass. 2005) (interpreting Massachusetts law);
Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Mich. 1991); Allianz Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 787 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17–18 (App. Div. 2004).
261. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 195 (explaining the
reasoning behind recognizing equitable subrogation in the context of insurers suing
defense lawyers).

900

RICHMOND POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 48: 857, 2011]

9/23/2011 2:50 PM

Independent Counsel in Insurance
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

As for potential breach of fiduciary duty claims by insurers against
independent counsel,262 those are understandably dead on arrival. The
lack of an attorney-client relationship between the insurer and independent
counsel dooms this cause of action.
Interestingly, independent counsel might request that the insurance
company agree not to sue them for malpractice as a condition of
accepting the insured’s representation. Although in some states lawyers
cannot enter into agreements prospectively limiting their liability to
clients263 or at least cannot require clients to make such agreements, in
the independent counsel context the insurance company is not the
defense lawyer’s client.264 As a result, there is no prohibition against a
lawyer tabbed as independent counsel’s requesting a malpractice waiver.
On the other hand, an insurer is not required to agree to such a waiver,
and nothing in a standard liability insurance policy obligates an insurer
to do so. The insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing also does not
compel it to agree to a malpractice waiver, first because the insurer’s
duty flows only to its insured, and second because the duty of good faith
and fair dealing cannot create duties or rights not already provided for in
an insurance policy.265
D. Insurers’ Vicarious Liability for Independent
Counsel’s Misconduct
Insureds who claim to have been harmed by their defense lawyers’
alleged negligence or other misconduct may sue those lawyers. In addition,
they often sue their insurers on the theory that an insurer is vicariously
liable for the acts of defense lawyers it hires. Insurers are attractive
litigation targets. Courts are split on insureds’ ability to sue insurers for
defense lawyers’ errors—although some are willing to recognize vicarious

262. See Long v. Century Indem. Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 490 n.8 (Ct. App. 2008)
(noting that independent counsel do not owe fiduciary duties to insurers).
263. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 54(2)
(2000) (establishing this approach), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1)
(2010) (permitting such an agreement where the client is independently represented).
264. Assurance Co. of Am. v. Haven, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 33 (Ct. App. 1995).
265. See Blondell v. Littlepage, 991 A.2d 80, 90–91 (Md. 2010) (quoting E. Shore
Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs., Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 182–84 (4th Cir. 2000)); Uno
Rests., Inc. v. Bos. Kenmore Realty Corp., 805 N.E.2d 957, 964 (Mass. 2004) (stating
that the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not “create rights and duties not
otherwise provided for in the existing contractual relationship”).
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liability,266 others are not.267 This is an agency law question. Courts
recognizing vicarious liability reason that a defense lawyer is the
insurer’s agent when conducting the defense.268 The insurer’s control of
the defense subjects it to vicarious liability.269 Even if a defense lawyer
is an independent contractor, the insurer’s duty of good faith and fair
dealing and duty to defend are nondelegable, and the insurer cannot
escape those duties by delegating its performance to defense counsel.270
Courts rejecting vicarious liability, on the other hand, reason that a
defense lawyer is an independent contractor who controls the conduct
and details of the insured’s defense. 271 The defense lawyer’s ethical
duties to the insured prevent the insurer from exercising the degree of
control over the litigation necessary for vicarious liability.272 As a result,
the defense lawyer’s independent contractor status insulates the insurer
from vicarious liability for the lawyer’s conduct.273
Whatever the merits of these competing approaches, an insurer cannot
be held vicariously liable for independent counsel’s negligence in a
typical case.274 In a typical independent counsel case, the insurer has no
266. See, e.g., Boyd Bros. Transp. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 729 F.2d 1407,
1409–11 (11th Cir. 1984); Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. P.B. Hoidale Co., 789 F. Supp. 1117,
1122–23 (D. Kan. 1992); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 294
(Alaska 1980); Stumpf v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 794 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Or. Ct. App. 1990);
Majorowicz v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 569 N.W.2d 472, 475–77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
267. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Equip. Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 963 F. Supp. 452,
455 (M.D. Pa. 1997); Lifestar Response of Ala., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 17 So. 3d 200,
218 (Ala. 2009); Marlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 761 So. 2d 380, 381 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Gibson v. Casto, 504 S.E.2d 705, 708 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 523 S.E.2d 564 (Ga. 1999); Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica
Mut. Ins. Co., 788 N.E.2d 522, 540 (Mass. 2003); Hawkins, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Specialty
Lines Ins. Co., No. A07-1529, 2008 WL 4552683, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2008);
Transcare N.Y., Inc. v. Finkelstein, Levine & Gittelsohn & Partners, 804 N.Y.S.2d 63,
64 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Feliberty v. Damon, 527 N.E.2d 261, 263 (N.Y. 1988));
Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 369 S.E.2d 367, 372 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d,
390 S.E.2d 150 (N.C. 1990); Mentor Chiropractic Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 744 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tex. 1998).
268. See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 789 F. Supp. at 1122.
269. Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 697–98 (Tenn.
2002).
270. Majorowicz, 569 N.W.2d at 477.
271. Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc., 788 N.E.2d at 540.
272. Ingersoll-Rand Equip. Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 454; Lifestar, 17 So. 3d at 218.
273. Ingersoll-Rand Equip. Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 454; Lifestar, 17 So. 3d at 218.
274. See, e.g., Maister Assocs. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 09-30453, 2009
WL 3461520, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 2009) (applying Louisiana law); Republic W. Ins.
Co. v. Spierer, Woodward, Willens, Denis & Furstman, 68 F.3d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 526 (Ct. App. 1973)); see also
14 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 156, § 202:37, at 202-94 (“The insurer is not . . .
responsible to the insured for the competence or lack thereof of an appointed counsel
who is, in fact, independent.”).
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right to control the defense, and it has no attorney-client relationship
with the lawyers serving as independent counsel. Because they are not
subject to the insurer’s control and do not represent it, independent
counsel cannot be characterized as the insurer’s agents.275 Even where
the insurer is allowed to appoint independent counsel, the lawyers’
relationship with the insurer in that case is merely contractual—it is not
an agency relationship. There is, quite simply, no basis for imposing
vicarious liability.
In Jacobs v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., for example, plaintiffs
Leonard and Janet Jacobs sued West Bend and its insured, Michael
Limbach Construction Company (MLCC), a sole proprietorship owned
by Michael Limbach, and others, for the defective construction of their
home.276 West Bend agreed to defend MLCC under a reservation of
rights and also agreed that MLCC should be defended by independent
counsel at West Bend’s expense.277 Limbach died and his widow, Betty
Limbach, as the administrator of his estate, hired Carol Beverly to
defend MLCC.278 Unfortunately, for reasons apparently linked to her
representation of Limbach’s estate, Beverly formulated a passive
defense strategy that resulted in a default judgment against MLCC.279
This led the trial court to rule that West Bend had breached its duty to
defend MLCC by affording it an ineffective defense.280 The court then

275. The principal’s right to control the agent’s actions is “the sine qua non of
agency.” Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009),
vacated, 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). In a case in which there is no conflict of interest
and the insurer controls the defense, the defense lawyer is sometimes thought to be the
insurer’s agent. See, e.g., Vulgamott v. Perry, 154 S.W.3d 382, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)
(stating this position in dicta). But that is not necessarily true. See Fletcher v. Anderson,
3 P.3d 558, 567 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Bell v. Tilton, 674 P.2d 468, 472–73
(Kan. 1983)); Bar Plan v. Cooper, 290 S.W.3d 788, 792–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). In a
jurisdiction that rejects the dual client doctrine and treats the insured as the defense
lawyer’s sole client as a matter of law, for example, the elimination of the attorney-client
relationship between the insurer and defense lawyer erases the only clear basis for
calling the defense lawyer the insurer’s agent. The same is true where the defense
lawyer and insurer agree that the insured will be the defense lawyer’s sole client. In such
cases, there is likely no other basis for recognizing an agency relationship between the
insurer and defense lawyer. The insurer’s retention of the defense lawyer for the insured,
without more, certainly does not create an agency relationship, nor does the insurer’s
mere payment of defense counsel’s legal fees.
276. 553 N.W.2d 800, 800–02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
277. Id. at 802.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 802–04.
280. Id. at 804.
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held that West Bend was obligated to indemnify MLCC for the default
judgment.281
West Bend appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, contending
that it discharged its duty to defend MLCC by allowing MLCC to retain
independent counsel of its choice.282 The court of appeals agreed, observing
further that Wisconsin law did not bind West Bend to Beverly’s strategy
and tactics, thereby depriving it of its coverage defense if Beverly’s
judgments proved to be wrong.283 The defense of the Jacobs’s lawsuit
was properly left to the attorney, Beverly, and the client, Betty
Limbach.284 Unless it abandoned its coverage defense, “West Bend had
no authority to intervene in, or interfere with, that relationship.”285 The
tactical decisions leading to the default judgment against MLCC were
Beverly and Betty Limbach’s to make, not West Bend’s.286 Accordingly,
the court of appeals reversed the trial court ruling regarding West Bend’s
duty to defend.287
V. CONCLUSION
Liability insurers fund the defense of most civil litigation. If a case is
tinged by a conflict of interest between the insured and insurer, both will
commonly rely on independent counsel to conduct the defense.
Independent counsel play an important role in insurance-related
litigation. Despite the importance, however, independent counsel’s roles
and responsibilities are often not fully understood by courts. There are
few published decisions to guide courts presented with independent
counsel controversies, and courts that turn to professional literature in
efforts to inform their decisions quickly realize that the subject of
independent counsel has not received the scholarly attention it deserves.
Lawyers selected to serve as independent counsel suffer from the same
informational deficiency as they attempt to understand their duties and
rights.
The means by which independent counsel are selected is sure to
remain a point of considerable disagreement between insurers and
insureds. Equally likely to persist going forward are disagreements over
independent counsel’s compensation and insurers’ ability to enforce
consultation and reporting requirements where, admittedly, they do not

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
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control the defense but nonetheless are heavily invested in the litigation.
Lawyers selected as independent counsel may not be willing to represent
insureds on terms that insurers routinely obtain from panel counsel.
Although insurers recognize the need to be flexible in negotiating
compensation arrangements with independent counsel and often pay
more than they otherwise would for an insured’s representation, insurers
have a right to insist on reasonable fees.
To the extent that parties can compromise and negotiate appropriate
solutions to their problems, they are wise to do so. This area of insurance
law has been murky for some while and is unlikely to clear in the near
future.
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